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In countries with low and stable inflation, price setters’ inflation expectations are highly
dispersed; especially so when they face fewer competitors. In contrast to the predictions of
standard models, realized inflation deviates significantly from price setters’ aggregate infla-
tion expectations. Instead, firms’ own-industry inflation expectations are more accurate, and
aggregate inflation tracks these expectations closely. This paper poses a new dynamic general
equilibrium model of rational inattention with oligopolistic pricing in which these patterns
emerge from the optimal choices of firms in information acquisition. A new micro-founded
Phillips curve relates aggregate inflation to firms’ expectations about their own competitors’
price changes, and firms optimally forego learning about aggregate variables to focus on their
competitors’ beliefs. This incentive is stronger when firms face fewer competitors and non-
existent under monopolistic competition. Using firm-level evidence, I calibrate the degree of
rational inattention as well as industry concentration and find that, relative to the benchmark of
monopolistic competition, the impact response of output (inflation) to a one percent monetary
policy shock is 20 basis points larger (smaller) when these strategic incentives are accounted
for. Limited competition at the micro-level also increases the half-lives of output and inflation
responses to monetary policy shocks by 12% and 15%, respectively.
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“[T]he precise manner in which expectations influence inflation deserves further study ...
Most importantly, we need to know more about the manner in which inflation expectations
are formed.”
Janet Yellen (October 2016)
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967), macroeconomists have emphasized
the importance of expectations for the evolution of prices in the economy. Almost every modern
monetary model relates aggregate price changes to price setters’ expectations about aggregate in-
flation.1 This insight has profoundly influenced monetary policy: central bankers treat anchored
expectations not only as a policy objective for controlling inflation, but also as a potential instru-
ment since the onset of the zero lower bound after the Great Recession through forward guidance.
In spite of this consensus, empirical evidence on price setters’ expectations about aggregate
inflation are at odds with this theoretical prediction. For instance, Kumar, Afrouzi, Coibion, and
Gorodnichenko (2015) show that despite a long history of low and stable inflation in New Zealand,
managers of price setting firms in that country are exceedingly uninformed about it.2 They make
average errors of 2 to 3 percentage points in perceiving current as well as forecasting future in-
flation, and revise their forecasts by an average of 3.4 percentage points after only three months.3
Similarly, Bryan, Meyer, and Parker (2015) document that managers in the U.S. also report much
higher as well as more dispersed expectations of overall price changes in the economy. While the
theory predicts that such high and volatile expectations of aggregate inflation should either pass
through to inflation or be accompanied by a deep contemporaneous recession, neither was the case
1The timing of these expectations are model-specific. For instance, New Keynesian sticky price models relate
inflation to expectations of future aggregate inflation, while imperfect information models, pioneered by Lucas (1972),
relate it to past expectations of current inflation.
2With a slight abuse of terminology, throughout the paper, I refer to a firm’s managers’ expectations as firm’s
expectations in the rest of the paper.
3A manager’s perception of inflation is defined as their nowcast of current inflation. In other words, this perception
is the expectation that is formed over current inflation.
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for these countries at the time of the surveys.
One cannot reconcile these empirical observations with our current models. Either the survey
data are inaccurate in reflecting expectations, or our baseline models are too simplified to capture
the channels that would explain this disconnect. With respect to the latter, I show in this paper how
stable inflation is consistent with such volatile expectations by introducing a new dynamic model
of rational inattention with oligopolistic competition. Even in absence of any firm specific shocks,
firms optimally, and strategically, choose to learn more about the prices of their competitors at the
expense of knowing less about aggregate variables, and set their prices based on what they expect
about their competitors’ prices rather than aggregate prices. I calibrate the degree of rational
inattention and competition using firm-level survey evidence and show that these features have
significant macroeconomic implications for the propagation of monetary policy shocks to inflation
and output.
To model the persistent forecast errors of firms in the data, I assume they have limited attention
and they decide how to allocate it. Although rational inattention is not the only explanation for
the persistence in forecast errors, complementary evidence from countries with volatile inflation is
inconsistent with alternative explanations such as financial illiteracy, scarcity of information, and
either complexity or lack of transparency in monetary policy. Comparing the U.S. and Argentina,
Cavallo, Cruces, and Perez-Truglia (2014) show that individuals in lower inflation contexts have
significantly weaker priors about the inflation rate, a finding that supports the rational inattention
hypothesis. Moreover, in a recent and ongoing project with the Central Bank of Iran, I conduct a
survey of firms’ expectations in Iran, a country that has been dealing with highly volatile inflation
over the last four decades. Despite the fact that inflation has ranged from 9% to 40% over the last
five years, firms’ inflation expectations are relatively precise. Their average expectation is only 2
percentage points away from the realized inflation, and despite the high volatility of inflation, the
dispersion of their expectations is only 3.5 percentage points. This evidence casts doubt on the
aforementioned alternative explanations, as it is highly unlikely that households or firm managers
in developed countries are less literate or have less access to information about monetary policy
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than managers in Iran or households in Argentina. In contrast, models of optimal inattention are
very much consistent with this behavior. It is more costly for a firm to ignore aggregate inflation if
it is more volatile as it is implied by a rational inattention motive, or to adopt a sparse maximization
approach as in Gabaix (2014).
The other building block of the model is the role of imperfect competition at the micro-level.
Although the economy consists of a large number of firms, each one of them only competes directly
with a finite number of others at the micro-level. When asked how many competitors they face in
their main product market, firms in New Zealand report only between 5 to 8 rivals on average,
with 35% of firms responding that they face fewer than 4 competitors, and only 5% reporting that
they have more than 15 competitors. This evidence point toward a significant deviation from the
assumption in standard macroeconomic models that every firm is one of a continuum and calls for a
careful reinvestigation of how limited competition at the micro-level affects the dynamics of prices.
Furthermore, new evidence on declining competition in the U.S. and the rise of superstar firms, as
documented by Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017) and Autor et al. (2017), makes the necessity of
such an assessment even more imminent.
Firms that compete with only a few others do not optimize over their price relative to an aggre-
gate price index but rather relative to the prices of their direct rivals, a feature which has important
implications for monetary policy when information acquisition is costly but optimal. Every firm
realizes that their rationally inattentive competitors will make mistakes in perceiving the shocks in
the economy.4 Since mistakes of others end up affecting their prices and accordingly the profits of
their competitors, even in an economy with a single aggregate shock, firms find themselves facing
an endogenous trade-off: how much to track the shock itself versus the mistakes of others. Such
firms find it optimal to coordinate their mistakes with their competitors by paying attention to their
beliefs, and given that attention is costly, such coordination comes at the cost of knowing less about
the fundamental shocks in the economy. In words of John Kenneth Galbraith, for these firms “[i]t
4 I define what I precisely mean by “mistakes” in the main body of the paper. In short, a mistake is the part of a
firm’s price which is unpredictable by the fundamental shocks of the economy.
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is far, far safer to be wrong with the majority than to be right alone.”5
The first contribution of this paper is to show that in the presence of this trade-off, a micro-
founded Phillips curve relates inflation primarily on price setters’ expectations about their com-
petitors’ price changes rather than their expectations about aggregate inflation. This can therefore
account for how, in countries like New Zealand and the U.S., aggregate inflation can remain low
and stable even when price setters’ expectations of aggregate inflation are not. The latter simply
play little role in price setting decisions when rationally inattentive price setters have strategic mo-
tives, which drive them to have more precise information about the prices of their competitors at
the cost of being less informed about aggregate inflation.6
The second contribution of this paper is to characterize the incentives of firms in tracking the
mistakes of their competitors, and document the quantitative implications of these incentives in the
propagation and amplification of monetary policy shocks in a dynamic general equilibrium model.
Within economies where firms face more direct competitors at the micro-level, they have lower
incentives in tracking the mistakes of their rivals because it is more unlikely for a larger group of
competitors to make a mistake on average. Consequently, firms facing a larger number of direct
competitors allocate a higher amount of their attention to learning the monetary policy shocks.
Therefore, it takes a shorter time for these firms to fully realize the magnitude of a monetary policy
shock and adjust their prices accordingly, which in turn translates to a lower persistence in the real
effects of a monetary policy shock. I find that inflation response to a one percent expansionary
monetary policy shock is 20 basis points lower on impact and its half-life is 2.5 quarters longer
when the informational effects of oligopolistic pricing is taken into account. Similarly, ignoring the
role of oligopolistic competition in information acquisition leads to underestimating the magnitude
of the impact response of output to such a shock by 20 basis points and its half-life by a quarter.
These results parallel the findings of Mongey (2018) that strategic behavior among oligopolistic
5The Guardian [UK] (28 July 1989).
6This result holds even without firm level or industry level shocks as rational inattention errors of a firms’ competi-
tors leaves firms with an endogenous trade-off for attention allocation. I abstract away from firm level shocks to study
the sole effect of these mistakes and the quantitative results in this set up are a lower bound for an extended model
that incorporates such shocks, since presence of firm level shocks would provide yet another reason for firms to divert
their attention from aggregate ones.
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firms in presence of menu costs generates endogenous stickiness in prices.7
Another contribution of this paper is calibrating the capacity of processing information, which
has been a difficult task for rational inattention literature so far due to lack of suitable data. Newly
available data on price setters’ expectations from New Zealand, however, creates an ideal ground
for the calibration of this parameter by directly measuring the degree of information rigidity in
firms’ forecasts of aggregate inflation. Moreover, by deriving the Phillips curve within the rational
inattention model, I also relate the capacity of processing information to its analogous parame-
ters in other models of information rigidity, namely noisy and sticky information models such as
Woodford (2003a) and Mankiw and Reis (2002) respectively, as well as empirical literature that
estimates these rigidities using survey data, namely Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012, 2015). I
show that this capacity directly maps to the Kalman gain, the weight that firms put on their new
information, in noisy information models, and the measure of firms that update their information
within a sticky information model, allowing for a simple comparison of the degree of informa-
tion rigidity across models. Utilizing this relationship, I find that the calibrated value of capacity
for processing information implies a much lower degree of information rigidity than commonly
needed in noisy and sticky information models. Price setters in my model ultimately are very good
at processing information, even better than professional forecasters in the U.S., but spend a portion
of that attention to track the mistakes of their competitors due to their strategic incentives rather
than tracking macroeconomic variables. Hence, in spite of being well-informed about their own
optimal prices, price setters’ macroeconomic beliefs endogenously become akin to those of agents
facing large information rigidities for macroeconomic variables.
The theoretical approach of this paper is closely related to the literature on endogenous in-
formation acquisition in beauty contests.8 In their seminal paper, Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009)
formalize the idea of tracking others’ beliefs in a setting with a measure of agents and show that the
7It is important to note that while both endogenous information acquisition and menu costs make the prices of more
competitive firms less rigid, they are fundamentally different frictions that affect firms across the economy. Therefore,
while a study that incorporates both these frictions together within an oligopolistic framework is yet to be done, the
results in this paper and Mongey (2018) establish a reasonable lower bound for the effects of limited competition on
propagation of monetary policy shocks to output and inflation under each of these frictions.
8For a comprehensive recent survey of this literature see Angeletos and Lian (2016).
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value of public information increases with strategic complementarity in actions.9 Within this lit-
erature, the closest paper to this one is Denti (2015) who formalizes static information acquisition
games with a countable number of players and an unrestricted information structure, and shows
that in such large games, players’ signals are independent conditional on the fundamental. I also
consider a large game by modeling the production side of the economy, but focus on a case where
every firm directly competes with a few others. Therefore, in spite of having a large number of
firms in the model, they optimally choose to pay attention to the mistakes of their few competitors,
and directly track their beliefs. Also, a major departure of my paper from this literature is that it is
the first one to investigate the implications of these oligopolistic incentives in a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model, and show that firms’ incentives in tracking one another’s beliefs can
have important implications for the magnitude as well as the persistence of output and inflation in
response to monetary policy shocks.
Finally, this paper also builds on the rational inattention literature and the seminal work of Sims
(2003, 2006). Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009, 2015) show how rational inattention on the part
of firms and households affect the dynamics of inflation and output in the economy. While this
literature has assumed that firms’ signals are independent conditional on the fundamental shocks,
I mainly depart from this literature by micro-founding the endogenous strategic interactions of
agents in tracking mistakes of one another and show that in presence of limited competition firms
choose signals that incorporate correlated errors. These correlated errors create a wedge between
aggregate inflation expectations and average expectations of firms from their own comeptitors’
price changes and drive the main results of this paper both in terms of a new Phillips curve and
also larger real effects for monetary policy shocks. The dynamic model of this paper also relates
to a very recent literature on characterizing dynamic incentives in information acquisition within
macroeconomic models. Mackowiak, Matejka, and Wiederholt (2016) show that rational inatten-
tion leads to a forward looking behavior in information acquisition of agents. Furthermore, by
9In a similar setting, Myatt and Wallace (2012) show that the endogenous information acquisition of agents be-
comes more public in nature as the degree of strategic complementarity increases. Colombo et al. (2014) show how
the acquisition of private information affects the value of public information.
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formalizing the dynamic incentives of agents in acquiring information, Afrouzi and Yang (2016)
show that agents’ optimal information acquisition strategy in dynamics is based on motives of
information smoothing over time. This paper departs from this literature by focusing mainly on
strategic incentives of firms rather than their dynamic incentives.10
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the nature of firms’ information ac-
quisition incentives in a simplified static model and derives a set of testable predictions. Section
3 relates the predictions of the model to the firm-level survey data from New Zealand. Section 4
presents the dynamic general equilibrium model and Section 5 discusses the impulse responses of
the calibrated model. Section 6 concludes. Moreover, all the technical derivations as well as the
proofs of all the propositions and corollaries are included in Appendices A and B, for the static
and dynamic models respectively.
2 A Static Model
The goal of this section is to endogenize informational choices of oligopolistic firms and illustrate
the equilibrium relationship between aggregate price and the expectations of firms within a static
model. The model presented here is a special case of the dynamic general equilibrium model that is
specified in Section 4. While the general dynamic model has to be solved by using computational
methods, the solution to the static case is in closed form, which provides insight for interpreting
the results of the dynamic model.
Since the main purpose of this section is to provide intuition, I focus on the economics of the
forces at work in the main text. All informal claims in this section are formalized in Appendix A,
and the proofs for propositions are included in Appendix A.8.




There are a large number of industries in the economy indexed by j 2 {1, . . . ,J}, and within every
industry there are K firms. Let index j,k denote firm k in industry j. K here represents the number
of firms in a specific industry that directly compete with one another, and is potentially different
than what traditional measures of competition would imply; while there may be a large number of
firms that produce the same type of good in an economy – such as coffee shops brewing coffee for
instance – each one of them does not compete with all the others to a same degree. In fact, when
asked how many direct competitors they face in their main product market, firms in New Zealand
report an average of 5 to 8. Given this, I model the economy to be composed of a large number of
these small groups.
Firms are price setters and their profits are affected by a normally distributed fundamental
shock that I denote by q ⇠N (0,1). For any realization of the fundamental, and a set of prices
chosen by firms across the economy, (q, p j,k) j,k2J⇥K , the losses of firm j,k in profits is given by the
distance between their price and a convex combination of q and the average of their competitors’
prices;
Lj,k((q, p j,k) j,k2J⇥K) = (p j,k  (1 a)q a 1K 1Âl 6=k
p j,l)2,
where a 2 [0,1) denotes the degree of within industry strategic complementarity within indus-
tries.11 Two assumptions in the specification of this environment are essential for the results that
follow. The first is the existence of strategic complementarity within industries, and the second
is the finiteness of the number of competitors within them.12 Given these, the objective is to un-
derstand, first, which expectations of firms matter for aggregate price dynamics, and second, how
these expectations are formed.
To illustrate the importance of endogenizing information choices of firms in this environment,
it is useful to first consider the case where information is exogenous. For an endowed information
11Here the fundamental q, and prices, (p j,k) j2J,k2K , can be interpreted as log-deviations from a steady state sym-
metric equilibrium, which allows us to normalize their mean to zero.
12I micro-found these features in the dynamic model, where the quadratic loss is based on a second order approxi-
mation to the profit function of oligopolistic firms and a depends on the household’s demand for their goods.
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set for the economy, let E j,k[.] be the expectation operator of firm j,k. Every firm chooses the price
that minimizes its expected loss:
8 j,k, p j,k = argminxE j,k[(x  (1 a)q a p j, k)2],
where p j, k denotes the average price of firm k’s competitors.13 Aggregating the best response of
the firms across the economy, we get the following expression for the aggregate price,
p= (1 a)E j,k[q]+aE j,k[p j, k], (1)
where E j,k[q] is the average expectation across firms of the fundamental, and E j,k[p j, k] is their
average expectation of their own competitors’ prices. While this equation resembles the usual re-
sult in beauty contest games, the key departure here is the assumption on finiteness of firms within
industries. The aggregate price no longer depends on the average expectation of the aggregate price
across firms, but the average expectation of their own-industry prices. In fact, when a is large, as
the data will strongly suggest in Section 3, it is mainly the latter that drives the aggregate price.
Therefore, in order to understand how prices are determined in the economy, we need to un-
derstand how firms form their expectations of both the fundamental as well as the prices of their
competitors.
2.2 The Information Choice Problem of the Firms
Firms make two choices. First, they choose an information structure subject to their finite amount
of attention that informs them about the fundamental and the prices of their competitors, and
second, they choose a pricing strategy that maps their information to a price.
I model the information choice problem of the firms following the rational inattention litera-
ture. The spirit of rational inattention is the richness of available information that it assumes for
13See, for instance, Morris and Shin (2002); Angeletos and Pavan (2007) for a discussion of such games with
exogenous information sets, and the value of information within them.
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an economy. This in itself separates a rational inattention economy from one with an information
structure in which agents either observe a set of exogenously imposed signals or choose their sig-
nals from a set that does not allow for sufficiently precise signals. In a rational inattention world,
however, if an action takes place after the nature draws a random shock, then perfect information
about that shock is available for the agents. For instance, if firms are setting their prices after a
monetary policy shock has taken place, it is unreasonable to assume that they do not have access
to its exact realization, which is also the primary building block of the full-information rational
expectations hypothesis. What distinguishes rational inattention from full information rational ex-
pectations, however, is the recognition of the fact that availability of information is a different
notion than its feasibility for the firms. The fact that perfect information is available about a mon-
etary policy shock does not necessarily imply that firms would choose to have perfect information
when attention is costly. Nonetheless, subject to this cost, firms behave optimally and choose their
information set such that it maximizes their ex ante payoffs.
Appendix A.4 formally shows that if the set of available signals S is rich enough, rationally
inattentive firms always prefer to observe a single signal, rather than observing multiple ones.14
The intuition behind this result is that if there is enough variation in the sources of news within the
economy, there is always a single signal available that is precisely what the manager would like to
see, subject to their limited attention.15
Therefore, a pure strategy for any firm j,k is to choose a signal, S j,k 2S , and a pricing strategy
that maps the realization of the signal into the firm’s price, p j,k : S j,k!R. I show in Appendix A.3
that in any equilibrium with Gaussian signals, pricing strategies are linear in firms’ signals. I take
this result as given here and focus on linear strategies, where firm j,k chooses Mj,k 2 R, such that
14See Section A.2 for a formal definition of a rich information structure. My definition of a rich information set
corresponds to the concept of flexibility in information acquisition in Denti (2015).
15To see this intuitively, note that the only benefit of information in this setting for a firm is to charge the correct
price. Therefore, firms’ prices will be revealing of the information that they acquire. Now, if the price of a firm is
fully revealing of their information, it means that information can be generated by a single signal. The richness of
information structure implies that such a signal exists. Suppose now that there is at least one firm whose information
is not fully revealed by their price, meaning that they acquired some information that they did not use in setting their
prices. But since information is costly and its only benefit is to charge the correct price, such an information acquisition
strategy cannot be optimal.
11
p j,k = Mj,kS j,k. Given a strategy profile for all other firms in the economy, (Sl,m,Ml,m)(l,m) 6=( j,k),
firm j,k’s rational inattention problem is
min(S j,k2S ,p j,k:S j,k!R)E[(p j,k  (1 a)q a 1K 1Âl 6=kMj,lS j,l)2|S j,k] (2)
s.t. I (S j,k;(q,Ml,mSl,m)(l,m) 6=( j,k)) k
where I (S j,k;(q,Ml,mSl,m)(l,m) 6=( j,k)) measures the amount of information that the firm’s signal
reveals about the fundamental and the prices of other firms in bits.16 This constraint simply requires
that a firm cannot know more than k bits about the fundamental q and the signals that others have
chosen in S . Although I restrict my analysis to Shannon’s mutual information function in this
paper, the main results hold for a more generic class of information cost functions. In Afrouzi
and Yang (2016) we extensively argue the properties of the cost function that drive firms to only
observe one signal, and through that signal pay strictly positive attention to multiple shocks. The
following defines an equilibrium for this economy.
Definition 1. A pure strategy equilibrium for this economy is a strategy profile (S j,k 2S ,Mj,k 2
R) j,k2J⇥K such that 8 j,k 2 J⇥K, (Sl,m,Ml,m)(l,m) 6=( j,k) solves j,k’s problem as stated in Equation
(2).
It is shown in Appendix A all of the equilibria for this game are equivalent and unique in one
sense: they all point toward a unique joint distribution in prices of firms.
The uniqueness of the joint distribution of prices in the equilibrium allows us to abstract from
the underlying signals and directly focus on how firms’ prices are related to one another. Let p j,k
be the price that firm j,k charges in the equilibrium. The finite attention of the firm implies that this
price cannot be fully revealing of the fundamental, as figuring out the fundamental with infinite
precision requires infinite attention on the part of the firm.
16I (.; .) is Shannon’s mutual information function. In this paper, I focus on Gaussian random variables, in which
case I (X ;Y ) = 12 log2(det(var(X)))  12 log2(det(var(X |Y ))). The Gaussian nature of the information structure is
self-consistent in the equilibrium. When a firms’ opponents choose Gaussian signals, under the quadratic loss it is also
optimal for the firm to choose a Gaussian signals. See Cover and Thomas (2012) for optimality of Gaussian signals
under quadratic objectives with Gaussian fundamentals.
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Definition 2. A mistake is a part of a firm’s price that is unpredictable by the fundamentals of the
economy.
Thus, any firm’s price can be decomposed into a the part that is correlated with the fundamental
and the part that is orthogonal to it:
p j,k = dq+ v j,k, v j,k ? q, d 2 R.
The vector (v j,k) j,k2J⇥K , therefore, contains the mistakes of all firms in pricing, with their joint
distribution being endogenously determined in the equilibrium. I define these orthogonal elements
mistakes because in a world where firms have infinite capacity to process information, all firms
perfectly learn the fundamental and set their prices exactly equal to q.
It is important to mention that these mistakes need not to be independent across firms. In fact,
by endogenizing the information choices of firms, one of the objectives here is to understand how
the mistakes of different firms relate to one another in the equilibrium, or intuitively how much
managers of competing firms learn about the mistakes of their rivals and incorporate them in their
own prices.
Moreover, the coefficient d , which determines the degree to which prices covary with the
fundamental of the economy, is also an equilibrium object. Our goal is to understand how d and
the joint distribution of mistakes rely on the underlying parameters of the model; a,K and k .
Definition 3. The amount of attention that a firm pays to a random variable is the mutual informa-
tion between their set of signals and that random variable. Moreover, for any two random variables
X and Y , we say a firm knows more about X than Y if it pays more attention to X than Y .
In the static model, the amount of attention is directly linked to the absolute value of the cor-
relation between a firm’s signal and the random variable to which the firm is paying attention.17
17For two normal random variables X and Y , let I (X ,Y ) denote Shannon’s mutual information between the two.
ThenI (X ,Y ) =  12 log2(1 r2X ,Y ) where rX ,Y is the correlation between X and Y . Notice thatI (X ,Y ) is increasing
in r2X ,Y .
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Appendix A shows that when others play a strategy in which 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l = dq+v j, k, the atten-
tion problem of firm j,k reduces to choosing the correlation of their signal with the fundamental




s.t. r2q +r2v  l ⌘ 1 2 2k .
Here sv ⌘ var(v j, k) 12 is the standard deviation of the average mistakes of j,k’s competitors,
rq is the correlation of the firm’s signal with the fundamental, and rv is its correlation with the
average mistake of its competitors. Moreover, l ⌘ 1 2 2k captures the total amount of attention
that the firm has at its disposal.18 The information processing constraint reduces such that the
square of the two correlations should sum up to an amount less than l .
The following proposition states the properties of the equilibrium. The closed form solutions
and derivations are included in Appendix A. I focus here on the forces that shape this equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium,
1. Firms pay attention not only to the fundamental, but also to the mistakes of their competitors:
r⇤v > 0.
2. A firms’ knowledge of the fundamental increases in the number of their competitors and









3. Firms do not pay attention to mistakes of those in other industries: 8( j,k),(l,m), if j 6= l,
p j,k ? pl,m|q.
The independence of mistakes from the fundamental implies an endogenously arisen trade-
off for firms in allocating their attention. Higher attention to competitors’ mistakes has to be
18l = 0 corresponds to k = 0 and l ! 1 corresponds to k ! •.
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compensated by lower attention to the fundamental but this in turn reduces a firm’s losses by
creating coordination between them and their rivals.
The presence of sv in the objective of the firm unveils an important force in determining the
incentive of a firm in paying attention to others’ mistakes. The firm cares not about the mistake of
any single competitor, but about the average mistake that its rivals make all together. Moreover,
these average mistakes will always have strictly positive standard deviation due to the finiteness of
competitors. It is only when K goes to infinity that the law of large numbers kicks in and sv = 0
in the equilibrium.19 Therefore, the more the mistakes of a firm’s competitors “wash out”, the less
the firm is worried about them.
Another important aspect of the Proposition 1 is how strategic complementarity influences the
choices of these firms. a is the underlying parameter that relates the payoff of a firm to mistakes
of its competitors. When a is zero, the firm pays no penalty for charging a price that is farther
away from the prices of its competitors, implying that the firm’s payoff depends only on how close
its price is to the fundamental itself. Since tracking the mistakes of others is costly in terms of
learning the fundamental, when a = 0, all firms focus solely on the fundamental and learn about
it as much as their finite attention allows them. As a gets larger, however, the payoffs of firms
depend more on the mistakes that others make and accordingly the firm finds it more in their
interest to track those mistakes. This illustrates the importance of micro-founding these strategic
complementarities, which is one of the main objectives of the model in Section 4.
Appendix A shows that in equilibrium
d = l  al
1 al .
This implies that the degree to which prices covary with the fundamental in an industry depends
on strategic complementarity and the capacity of processing information while it is independent of
19This is an equilibrium outcome as sv is determined by the endogenous choices of firms. To see how this emerges
in the equilibrium, notice that if K ! •, a firm has no incentive to pay attention to others’ mistakes if they are
independent as the law of large numbers would imply sv = 0. Since incentives are symmetric, in the equilibrium all
firms prefer to have independent mistakes, implying that sv = 0.
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the number of firms in the industry, a feature of the static model that goes away in dynamics where
strategic complementaries are micro-founded.
2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Expectations
Having characterized the equilibrium, we now have the necessary tools to answer our motivat-
ing question on the relationship between equilibrium prices and expectations. Recall that in the
equilibrium the average price is given by
p= (1 a)E j,k[q]+aE j,k[p j, k].
Here, the goal is to understand how the aggregate price co-moves with the average expectations
of firms from the objects of the model. The next proposition derives the necessary results for the
argument that follows.
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the aggregate price co-moves more with the average expectations
from own-industry prices than average expectations of the aggregate price itself, meaning that
cov(p,E j,k[p j, k])> cov(p,E j,k[p]).
Moreover, the two converge to each other as K! •.
Therefore, what firms know about the prices of their competitors matters more for the deter-
mination of the aggregate price than what they know about the aggregate price itself. This result
also holds in the dynamic model in the sense that inflation is driven more by the expectations of
industry price changes, than the expectations over inflation itself. The following Corollary shows
that the realized price is also closer to the average own-industry price expectations than the average
expectation of the aggregate price.
Corollary 1. In equilibrium, the realized price is closer in absolute value to the average expecta-
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tions from own-industry prices than the average expectation of the aggregate price itself.
|p E j,k[p j, k]|< |p E j,k[p]|
The intuition behind these results relies solely on the incentives of firms in paying attention to
the mistakes of their competitors. In equilibrium, the signals that firms observe are more informa-
tive of their own industry prices than the aggregate economy:
S j,k =
covaries with aggregate pricez}|{
p +u j| {z }
covaries with industry prices
+ e j,k,
where u j ? p is the common mistake in industry j and e j,k is the independent part of firm j,k’s
mistake. The fact that var(u j) 6= 0 by Proposition 1 implies that the firm would be more confident
in predicting their own industry price changes than the aggregate price, and the two would become
the same only if there was no coordination within industries, which happens when K! •.
This result, along with its counterpart in the dynamic model, shows how stable inflation can
be an equilibrium outcome even when agents’ expectations of that inflation are ill-informed. What
firms need to know in terms of figuring out their optimal price is a combination of the fundamental
q and their own industry price changes. While the aggregate price will be correlated with both
of these objects, it does not by itself play an important role in firms’ profits so they do not need
to directly learn about it. Thus, the question becomes how well-informed firms are about their
industry price changes versus the fundamental.
Proposition 3. In the equilibrium, if strategic complementarity is high enough, a firm knows more
about the average price of its competitors than about the fundamental and the aggregate price. A
sufficient condition for this result is if al   12 .20
To see the reason, notice that the average price of a firm’s competitors incorporates their aver-
20The necessary and sufficient condition in this sense has a complicated expression that is derived in the proof of
the Proposition. It is shown that this result could hold even in occasions when al < 12 but K is small enough. For the
purposes of this section, however, we only focus on this sufficient condition.
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age mistake:
p j, k = dq+ v j, k.
Hence, if a firm only paid attention to the fundamental, it would then know more about the fun-
damental than the prices of its competitors since their information would be orthogonal to the
mistakes of others. It is only when the firm pays enough attention to v j, k that it would know more
about p j, k than q.
2.4 An AS-AD Framework and Non-Neutrality of Money
The closed form solution for the static model provides an intuitive framework for analyzing the
real effects of a shock to the nominal demand. In this simple setup the aggregate demand curve is
given by the fact that the deviations of aggregate price and output in the economy from their mean
should add up to the shock to the aggregate demand, q:
p= y+q.
Moreover, the equilibrium covariance of the aggregate price with q, as characterized in the previous
section, implies the following aggregate supply curve.21
p= (22k  1)(1 a)y.
Figure (I) shows how these real effects work in a classic AS-AD graph. When a positive shock
to q shifts the aggregate demand curve of the economy to the right, firms do not observe it per-
fectly. Instead, they observe a signal whose value is larger than its mean. From the perspective
of any firm, however, such a realization for its signal can come from a combination of three in-
dependent sources: an increase in aggregate demand q, a common mistake of their industry in
perceiving the realization of q, or an independent mistake on their own part in perceiving the value
21Aggregate supply can be derived from the equilibrium result p= dq= d (p+ y)) p= d1 d y.
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of q. The non-neutrality of money rises from firms’ different incentives in responding to each of
these possibilities. The degree to which a firm increases their price due to a change in q versus
a common mistake in their industry is different, while they would rather not change their price at
all in response to their own independent mistakes. These different incentives make firms reluctant
in responding one to one to their realized signal: they respond by a smaller magnitude due to the
possibility that it may simply be a mistake, bearing in mind also the beliefs and responses of their
competitors. As a result, when q goes up by one percent, firms across the economy increase their
prices by less than that, on average. This creates an excess demand for goods, which increases the
aggregate output.
The slope of the AS curve, which determines how an increase in q is divided between prices and
output, depends on how much firms are capable of separating the three independent sources that
affect their signals from one another. As k increases, mistakes become smaller in the equilibrium
as all firms see more informative signals of q. Therefore, if a firm sees a signal larger than its
mean, they assign more probability to the case that the increase is coming from q rather than a
mistake on their own or their competitors’ part. Hence, they respond more strongly to their signals
with a larger increase in their prices, which diminishes the effect of the shock on their output.
Moreover, when strategic complementarity is smaller, the firms worry less about the mistakes of
their competitors, and focus a higher amount of their attention on finding out the realization of q,
which again diminishes the real effects of the shock. In the extreme case when k ! •, signals
are infinitely precise in revealing the realization of q and all firms respond one to one to their
signals. This corresponds to an infinite slope for the AS curve where money is neutral, and output
is completely unaffected by changes in the nominal aggregate demand.
3 Model Predictions and Relation to the Data
I use a unique quantitative survey of firms’ expectations from New Zealand, which is comprehen-
sively discussed in Coibion et al. (2015); Kumar et al. (2015), to assess the predictions of the model
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in the previous section. The survey was conducted in multiple waves among a random sample of
firms in New Zealand with broad sectoral coverage. Here, I only rely on the aspects of the survey
that link the competitiveness of firms to the quality of their information. Motivated by the predic-
tions of the model, I focus specifically on firms’ quality of information about aggregates relative
to their industry prices.
3.1 Number of Competitors and Strategic Complementarity
The two underlying assumptions of this paper that drive its main results are the finiteness of firms
within industries and the existence of industry-level strategic complementarities. Two questions in
the survey directly measure these for every firm within the sample and address these assumptions.
The first asks firms how many direct competitors they face for their main product or product
line. The average firm in the sample reports that they face eight competitors, as documented in
Table (I), with 35% of firms reporting that they face four or fewer competitors. A breakdown
of firms’ answers from different industries shows that this average is fairly uniform across them.
Column (3) of the table also reports a weighted average of firms’ answers to this question based
on their share of production in the whole sample. This weighted average aims to capture the
representativeness of each firm in the economy, and the fact that it is 5 shows that larger firms,
with higher shares of production, face fewer competitors than the average firm in the sample.
To capture the degree of within industry strategic complementarity the following questions was
implemented in the survey.
“[S]uppose that you get news that the general level of prices went up by 10% in
the economy:
a. By what percentage do you think your competitors would raise their prices on
average?
b. By what percentage would your firm raise its price on average?
c. By what percentage would your firm raise its price if your competitors did not
change their price at all in response to this news?”
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Given this hypothetical question, the pricing best response derived in the previous section allows
us to back out the degree of strategic complementarity for each firm:
p j,k =
answer to b.z }| {
(1 a)E j,k[q]| {z }
answer to c.
+a E j,k[p j, k]| {z }
answer to a.
.
The average a implied by the responses of firms to this question is 0.9, which is relatively
uniform across different industries. These responses indicate a high degree of strategic comple-
mentarity, which is in line with the standard calibrations of the analog of this parameter in the
literature for the U.S.22 This high degree of strategic complementarity is consistent with the large
forecast errors of firms about aggregate inflation, as the model predicts these firms would pay a
large amount of attention to what their competitors are doing. Based on the analysis in this paper,
Frache and Lluberas (2017) ask the same question from firms in Uruguay. They find a much lower
degree of strategic complementarity within that economy and consistent with the predictions of the
model here they also document much smaller forecast errors of aggregate inflation among those
firms.
3.2 Knowledge about Industry versus Aggregate Inflation
One of the main predictions of the model is that in the presence of coordination at the micro-level,
firms are more aware of their industry price changes than the aggregate price.
In the fourth wave of the survey, conducted in the last quarter of 2014, firms were asked to
provide their nowcasts of both industry and aggregate yearly inflation. Figure (II) shows the distri-
bution of firms’ nowcasts of these two objects. While the average nowcast for aggregate inflation,
4.3%, is very high and far from the actual inflation of 0.8%, the average nowcast of firms from
their industry prices, 0.95%, is very close to this realized inflation. This observation directly par-
allels with the result in Corollary 1 that shows under imperfect competition prices are closer to
average expectations of firms from their own industry prices than their average expectation of the
22See, for instance, Mankiw and Reis (2002); Woodford (2003b).
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aggregate price. Also, Table (II) reports the size of firms’ nowcast errors in perceiving the two.23
The average absolute nowcast error from industry inflation is 1.2 percentage points, a magnitude
that is considerably lower than the average absolute nowcast error about aggregate inflation, 3.1
percentage points. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of Proposition 3 which states
that in presence of high strategic complementarities firms are relatively more aware of their in-
dustry price changes than the aggregate ones. In addition, Figure (III) shows that on top of this
striking difference in the averages, the distributions of these nowcast errors are skewed in opposite
directions: for nearly two-thirds of firms, their nowcast error of the aggregate inflation is larger
than the mean error, while the reverse is true in the case of industry inflation.
From the perspective of the standard models of inflation dynamics which relate the rate of infla-
tion to firms’ expectations about aggregate inflation, these high expectations of aggregate inflation
seem very puzzling. Despite these large inflation expectations among firms, which are consistently
higher than the 2% target of the RBNZ in all waves of the survey, coupled with the fact that there
were no significant changes in the output gap of New Zealand in this period, yearly inflation in
New Zealand has been even lower than the target. Since the year 2012, yearly inflation has been
averaging around 1%, with a high of 1.6% in the second quarter of 2014 and a low of 0.1% in the
third quarter of 2015.
Finally, in the sixth wave of the survey, firms were asked to assign probabilities to different
outcomes regarding industry and aggregate yearly inflation.24 Table (III) reports the standard devi-
ation of managers’ reported distribution for both of these objects, which I interpret as their subjec-
tive uncertainty. Firms are relatively less uncertain about their industry inflation in the following
year than the aggregate one. This directly relates to the prediction of the model in Proposition 3
that in the presence of high industry level strategic complementarity firms should know more about
their industry price changes than aggregate inflation.
23Nowcast errors for industry inflation are measured as the distance between firms’ nowcast and the realized inflation
in their industry.
24Firms were asked the following two questions: “Please assign probabilities (from 0-100) to the following ranges
of overall price changes in the economy/your industry over the next 12 months for New Zealand.” The bins to which
firms assigned probabilities were identical in both questions.
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3.3 Uncertainty about Inflation versus Number of Competitors
Proposition 1 predicts that knowledge about the aggregate price should be increasing in the number
of a firm’s competitors. This is a unique feature of the oligopolistic rational inattention model and
is a testable prediction. To test this prediction, I run the following regression.
spi = b0+b1Ki+ ei,
where spi is firm i’s subjective uncertainty about the aggregate inflation, and Ki is the number of
competitors that they report in their main product market. The model’s prediction translates to the
null hypothesis that b1 < 0. Panel (a) of Table (IV) reports the result of this regression, and shows
that this is indeed the case. This result is also robust to including firm controls such as firms’ age
and employment as well as industry fixed effects. The significance of this coefficient in explaining
firms’ uncertainty about aggregates is an observation that is not reconcilable neither with full in-
formation rational expectation models nor any other macroeconomic model of information rigidity
prior to this paper, and indicates the importance of strategic incentives in how much firms pay
attention to aggregate variables in the economy.
For comparison, I also run a similar regression of firms’ uncertainty about their industry prices
on their number of competitors:
spii = b3+b4Ki+ e˜i,
where now spii is the standard deviation of firm i’s reported distribution for their own industry.
Panel (b) of Table (IV) shows these two are also negatively correlated, yet with a smaller mag-
nitude. This is also consistent with the model. As the number of a firm’s competitors increase,
firms become more certain about their price changes: in larger industries mistakes wash out more
effectively due to the law of large numbers, making the average price change more predictable.
The smaller magnitude of the coefficient on the number of competitors, however, carries an im-
portant insight from the model. The same force that makes the prices of a firms’ competitors more
predictable, also discourages the firm from paying attention to their competitors’ mistakes. To see
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this in the model, recall that
p j, k = dq+ v j, k.
As the number of a firm’s competitors goes up, their knowledge of the fundamental, q, also goes
up, which is the result in Panel (a). However, this only happens because firms shift their attention
from v j, k to q, meaning that the decrease in uncertainty about the fundamental is accompanied by
an increase in uncertainty about the mistakes of others. Hence, the decrease in uncertainty about
the fundamental with the number of competitors should be lower in magnitude for industry prices
than aggregate ones.
Panel (c) of Table (IV) aims at capturing this effect by regressing the difference between firms’
uncertainty about their industry relative to the aggregate inflation on the number of their competi-
tors. This difference is positively correlated with the number of firms’ competitors, consistent with
the prediction that firms become relatively more uncertain about their industry price changes once
the decline in uncertainty about the aggregates is extracted.
4 A Micro-founded Dynamic Model
This section extends the simple static model of Section 2 to a dynamic general equilibrium model,
and micro-founds the loss function and within industry strategic complementarities that were taken
as given in the static model. The model is then used to quantitatively analyze the effects of firms’
strategic incentives in propagation of monetary policy shocks to aggregate output and inflation. All
the derivations as well as the proofs for the propositions regarding the dynamic model are included
in Appendix B.
4.1 Households
There is a large variety of goods produced in the economy. In particular, the economy consists
of a large number of industries, j 2 J ⌘ {1, . . . ,J}; and each industry consists of K   2 firms
that produce weakly substitutable goods. The household takes the nominal prices of these goods
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as given and forms a demand over the product of each firm in the economy. In particular, the






whereCj,t ⌘F(Cj,1,t , . . . ,Cj,K,t) is the composite demand of household for the goods produced
in industry j, and F(.) : RK ! R is a continuously differentiable aggregation function that is ho-
mogeneous of degree 1, symmetric across its arguments, and such that F(1, . . . ,1) = K. Equation
(3) denotes that the aggregate consumption of the household is Cobb-Douglas in the composite
goods of industries. Also, household’s preferences over goods within industries, captured by the
form of F(.), is central in determining the degree of within-industry strategic complementarity.25
Since the main purpose of this paper is to study the effects of rational inattention under im-
perfect competition among firms, I assume that households are fully informed about prices and
wages.26
The representative household’s problem is
max





b t [log(Ct) fLt ] (4)
s.t. Â
j,k





F(Cj,1,t , . . . ,Cj,K,t)J
 1
.
where E ft [.] is the full information rational expectations operator at time t, Lt is the labor supply of
25A specific form for F(.), which I will use to provide intuition in this section, is a CES aggregator with elasticity
of substitution h > 1,











The generality assumption on the form of function F(.) is mainly due to calibration purposes, as the CES aggregator
is too restrictive in matching the level of strategic complementarity observed in the data. This generality assumption
is not new to the literature of oligopolistic pricing in macroeconomic models. See, for instance, Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992).
26While this might not be a very realistic assumption, it is the standard approach in the literature as a natural first
step in separating the implications of rational inattention for households versus firms.
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the household, Bt is their demand for nominal bonds,Wt is the nominal wage, it is the net nominal
interest rate, P j,k,t denotes the profit of firm j,k at time t, and T is a constant lump sum tax that
is used by the government to finance a hiring subsidy for firms in order to eliminate any long-run
inefficiencies of imperfect competition.
I show in Appendix B that household’s optimal behavior implies the following demand function
for the product of firm j,k:
Cj,k,t = PtCtD(Pj,k,t ;Pj, k,t) (5)
where Pt is the price of the aggregate consumption bundleCt , Pj,k,t is firm j,k’s price at t, and Pj, k,t
is the vector of other firms’ prices in sector j. Moreover, the function D(.; .) is homogeneous of
degree  1.27
Finally, letQt ⌘ PtCt be the aggregate nominal demand for the economy. Then, the household’s
intertemporal Euler and labor supply equations are given by:




The log-utility implies that the intertemporal Euler equation simply relates the level of nominal
interest rate to the expected growth of the aggregate demand. This creates a natural duality between
formulating monetary policy either in terms of the nominal interest rates, or specifying a law of
motion for the aggregate demand, which is a well-known and frequently used result in the literature.
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28The linear disutility in labor is a common assumption in the models of monetary non-neutrality (for instance,
see Golosov and Lucas Jr (2007)) which eliminates the source of across industry strategic complementarity from the




Firms take wages and their demand from the household side as given and at each period set their
prices based on their information set at that time; while committing to produce the realized level
of demand that their prices induce. Since my main objective is to examine the real effects of
monetary policy through endogenous information acquisition of these firms, I abstract from other
sources of monetary non-neutrality, and in particular assume that prices are perfectly flexible.29
After setting their prices, firms then hire labor from a competitive labor market and produce with a
production function that is linear in their labor demand; Yj,k,t = Lj,k,t . To eliminate the steady state
inefficiencies of imperfect competition, I assume that there is a constant subsidy in the economy
for hiring a unit of labor. Thus, firm j,k’s nominal profit at time t is given by
P j,k,t = QtP(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt),
P(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt)⌘ (Pj,k,t  (1  s¯)Wt)D(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t).
Here, Pj,k,t is firm j,k’s own price, Pj, k,t is the vector of other firms’ price in industry j, Qt is the
nominal aggregate demand,Wt is the nominal wage, and s¯ is the hiring subsidy per unit of labor.
I assume that there is a large number of industries in the economy so that every firm’s effect on
aggregate nominal demand is negligible.
Firms are rationally inattentive. At each period t they take their initial information set as
given and choose an arbitrary number of signals from a set available signals, S t , subject to an
information processing constraint. They then form their new information set and set their prices
based on that. In Appendix B, I carefully define these concepts for the dynamic model. Here, I
focus on characterizing the firms’ problem taking these definitions as given.
A strategy for any firm is to choose a set of signals to observe over time (S j,k,t ⇢ S t)•t=0
and a pricing strategy that maps its information set to their optimal price at any given period,
29There is also a new growing literature that argues information rigidities are more consistent with certain aspects
of the pricing behavior of firms rather than Calvo pricing or menu cost models. For instance, see, Stevens (2015);
Khaw, Stevens, and Woodford (2016).
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Pj,k,t : Stj,k!R, where Stj,k = (S j,k,t)tt=0 is the firm’s information set at time t. Accordingly, given
a strategy for all other firms in the economy, (Stj,l ⇢ S t ,Pj,l,t : Stj,l ! R)•t=0, j2J,l 6=k, firm j,k’s
problem is to maximize the net present value of their life time profits given an initial information
set that they inherit at the time of maximization:
Vt(St 1j,k ) = maxS j,k,t⇢S t ,Pj,k,t(Stj,k)
E[Q0P(Pj,k,t(Stj,k),Pj, k,t(Stj, k),fQt)| {z }
contemporaneous payoff of Stj,k
+ bVt+1(Stj,k)| {z }
continuation value of Stj,k
|St 1j,k ]
s.t. I (S j,k,t ,(Qt ,Pl,m,t(Stl,m))
t
t=0,l,m 6= j,k|St 1j,k ) k,
Stj,k = S
t 1
j,k [{S j,k,t}| {z }
evolution of the information set
. (6)
where the constraint implies that the amount of information that a firm can add to its information
set about the state of the economy at a given time is bounded by k bits. 30
4.3 Monetary Policy and General Equilibrium
For simplicity, I assume that the monetary policy is set in terms of the growth of aggregate de-
mand. This is justified by the household’s intertemporal Euler equation as it establishes a direct
relationship between nominal rates and the expected growth in nominal demand. Following the




) = r log(Qt 1
Qt 2
)+ut . (7)
30We show in Afrouzi and Yang (2016) when such a problem is indeed a contraction mapping so that a unique V (.)
exists. Here we take that result as given.
31See, for instance, Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt (2009); Mankiw and Reis (2002); Woodford (2003a).
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Definition 4. A general equilibrium for the economy is an allocation for the household,
WH ⌘ {(Cj,k,t)( j,k)2J⇥K,Lst ,Bt}•t=0,
a strategy profile for firms given an initial set of signals
WF ⌘ {(S jk,t ⇢S t ,Pj,k,t ,Ldj,k,t ,Yj,k,t)•t=0} j,k2J⇥K [{S 1j,k} j,k2J⇥K,
and a set of prices {it ,Pt ,Wt}•t=0 such that
1. Households: given prices and WF , the household’s allocation solves their problem as speci-
fied in Equation (4).
2. Firms: given prices and WH , and the implied labor supply and output demand curves, no
firm has an incentive to deviate from WF .
3. Monetary Policy: given prices, WF and WH , {Qt ⌘ PtCt}•t=0 satisfies the monetary policy
rule specified in Equation (7).
4. Markets clear:
Goods Markets: Cj,k,t = Yj,k,t ,8 j,k 2 J⇥K,
Labor Markets : Â( j,k)2J⇥K Ldj,k,t = L
s
t .
4.4 The Source of Strategic Complementarity
Contrary to models of monopolistic competition where constant elasticity of demand implies a con-
stant markup for firms over their marginal cost, an oligopolistic environment makes these markups
codependent. When a firm in an industry changes their price, in essence, it is influencing the dis-
tribution of the demand across all firms in their industry. In other words, the elasticity of demand
for firms within an industry depends on the relative prices of all those firms and is no longer a
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constant. A look at the best response of a firm to a particular realization of Pj, k,t and Qt manifests
this codependence:
P⇤j,k,t = µ(P⇤j,k,t ,Pj, k,t)| {z }
optimal markup
f(1  s¯)Qt| {z },
wage





This clarifies the source of industry level strategic complementarity in this economy. Firms
lose profits if they do not adjust their markup due to changes in their competitors’ prices. The





, µ = hh 1 +
1
(h 1)(K 1) .
The specific example of the CES aggregator shows that more competition in terms of the num-
ber of firms not only decreases the average markups of firms, which is a very intuitive implication
of competition, but also decreases the strategic complementarity within industries. The reason for
the latter is simple: as the number of competitors grows within an industry, every firm becomes
smaller in proportion to its competitors and equally incapable of affecting their elasticity of demand
by changing their price.
These expressions for the CES aggregator also show why this particular aggregator is too re-
strictive for a quantitative analysis of this model. Strategic complementarity under this aggregator
is bounded above by 0.5 because K   2, which is no way near the value of 0.9 that is observed in
the data. This is due to the fact that the CES aggregator does not allow the elasticity of demand to
32Here, eD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t) ⌘   ∂Yj,k,t∂Pj,k,t
Pj,k,t
Yj,k,t
is firm j,k’s elasticity of demand with respect to its own price. The as-
sumption that the aggregator function over industry goods, F(.), is homogeneous of degree one implies that demand
elasticities and markups are independent of the level of nominal prices and solely depend on the relative prices of firms
within an industry. In other words, µ(., .) and eD(., .) are homogeneous of degree zero. In particular, in the case of the
CES aggregator for industry goods this elasticity is







be sensitive enough to the prices of other firms. To match this level of strategic complementarity
quantitatively, while simultaneously keeping the qualitative properties of the CES aggregator, I
consider the following generalization, and in Appendix B I derive the demand functions that imply
them:














where the new parameter x now captures how the elasticity of demand changes with the relative
prices within the industry and allows us to match the elasticity of the markup independently.33
Notice that this specification preserves the steady state properties of the CES aggregator up to the
elasticities of demand and average markups, and only changes the elasticity of the elasticity of
demand, which is related to the third order derivatives of the function F(.). It embeds the CES
aggregator when x = 0, and the two are the same function for all values of x when K! •, which
corresponds to to having a measure of firms within industries.34
Proposition 4. There is strict industry level strategic complementarity in pricing, meaning that
a 2 (0,1), as long as a firm’s elasticity of demand is increasing in their price, which corresponds
to x >  1. Moreover, strategic complementarity is increasing in the elasticity of substitution h ,
decreasing in the number of firms within industries, K, and converges to zero as K ! •. The
expression for a is
a = (1+x )(1 h
 1)
K+x (1 h 1) .
These elasticities preserve the qualitative properties of the CES aggregator for the strategic
33While the closed form solution for F(.) is not easy to derive, what we care about are these elasticities, and not
the closed form of F(.) per se. An alternative method to match a higher degree of super-elasticity than that of the
CES aggregator is to employ a more general aggregator as in Kimball (1995), a recent survey of whose applications is
discussed in Gopinath and Itskhoki (2011) and Klenow and Willis (2016). I derive the demand function of the firms
given a general form of such an aggregator in Appendix B, and discuss its implications for the degree of strategic
complementarity. I show that while the Kimball aggregator allows for calibrating a to the level that is observed in the
data, such a calibration leads to a counterintuitive result where the degree of strategic complementarity is decreasing
with the elasticity of substitution across industry goods, meaning that a firm’s profit depends less on the prices of its
competitors when their goods become more substitutable. I depart from this aggregator by directly specifying the
elasticity functions.
34Notice that these elasticities are also well-defined in the sense that eD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t)  1 in a neighborhood around
any symmetric point.
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complementarity. As the number of competitors for a firm goes up, their elasticity of demand loses
its sensitivity to the price of the firm relative to its competitors and a decreases, with a # 0 for
K! •. In this limit, the firm knows that their demand is only due to the weak substitutability of
their good with respect to their competitors, so that their elasticity of demand is just the elasticity
of substitution between their good and those of their competitors.
The elasticity of substitution, however, has the opposite effect on strategic complementarity.
The higher is h , the more substitutable the firm’s product is with those of its competitors im-
plying that the firm would lose more profits if they do not match the prices of their competitors.
Accordingly, more substitutability translates into higher strategic complementarity.
Finally, a larger value for the parameter x , which captures the sensitivity of the elasticity of a
firm’s demand to the relative prices in its industry, imply a larger degree of strategic complementar-
ity. This parameter now allows us to match the super-elasticity of a firm’s demand independently
from its demand elasticity.
4.5 Incentives in Information Acquisition
Appendix B thoroughly discusses my approach for solving the rational inattention problem of the
firms. Here I discuss the incentives of firms in acquiring information.
In addition to the strategic incentives discussed in the static model, the specification of a firm’s
problem in Equation (6) shows how their information set becomes the source of a new dynamic
trade-off. At every period, firms understand that the information they choose to see will not only
inform them about their contemporaneous optimal price, but also about their future payoffs. While
the dynamic incentives of a rationally inattentive agent is the main focus of Afrouzi and Yang
(2016), the main objective here is to understand the effects of the strategic trade-off that imperfectly
competitive firms face in allocating their attention.
To better understand the separate roles that these strategic incentives play in the their price-
setting behavior of firms, in this paper I shut down the dynamic incentives of firms completely by
assuming that they do not endogenize the continuation value of information in their maximization
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problem. This does not eliminate the necessity of tracking firms’ signals over time, as they still
rely on their previous signals in forming their beliefs about the fundamental and the prices of their
competitors. However, the lack of dynamic incentives implies that firms ignore these continuation
values in choosing their information.
To solve the firms’ problem, I derive the second order approximation of firms’ losses from
sub-optimal pricing following the rational inattention literature, and assume that they minimize the
expected net present value of these losses subject to the attention constraint.35 At any time, given
a realization of Pj, k,t and Qt , a firm’s profit loss from charging a price Pj,k,t is given by
L(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt) ⌘ maxx P(x,Pj, k,t ,Wt) P(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt)
= (p j,k,t  (1 a)wt a 1K 1Âl 6=k
p j,l,t)2.
Here, small letters denote percentage deviations from the steady state, and a is the degree of
industry level strategic complementarity which is now directly linked to the micro-foundations of
the model. The following Proposition derives the form of the signals that firms choose to see in
the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Given a strategy profile for all other firms in the economy, a particular firm prefers
to see only one signal at any given time. Moreover, the optimal signal of firm j,k at time t is
S j,k,t = (1 a)qt +a p j, k,t(Stj, k)+ e j,k,t
where qt is the nominal aggregate demand, p j, k,t is the average price of j,k’s competitors, and
e j,k,t is the rational inattention error of the firm.
The closed form for the optimal signal in this case shows how firms incorporate the mistakes
of their competitors into their information sets. To see this given the strategy of others, decompose
35Notice that profit maximization is equivalent to minimizing these losses over time. The second order approxi-
mation reduces the state space of the problem from a whole distributions to its covariance matrix by implying that
the distribution is a multivariate Normal. Moreover, since optimal signals under Gaussian fundamentals and quadratic
objectives are also Gaussian, it allows us to only focus on Gaussian signals without loss of generality.
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their average price at time t to its projection on the history of fundamentals and the part that is
orthogonal to them
p j, k,t(Stj, k) = p j, k,t(S j, k,t)|q| {z }
projection on realizations of all qt t ’s
+ v j, k,t| {z }
orthgonal to all realizations of qt t ’s
.
This is analogous to the decomposition that I did in the static model. It separates the average prices
of others to a part that is linearly projected on current and past realizations of the fundamental, and
a part that is orthogonal to it, denoted by v j, k,t . Similar to before, we call these the mistakes of a
firm’s competitors in pricing. Notice that the finiteness of the number of competitors immediately
implies that var(v j, k,t) 6= 0. Given this decomposition, the optimal signal of the firm is
S j,k,t =
predictive of industry price changesz }| {
(1 a)qt +a p j, k,t(S j, k,t)|q| {z }
predictive of qt t ’s
+av j, k,t + e j,k,t .
This decomposition of the signal illustrates the main departure of this paper from models that
assume a measure of firms. Since var(v j, k,t) 6= 0, the signal of a firm co-varies more with the
price changes of its competitors than with the fundamentals of the economy.36 When there is a
measure of firms, however, the term av j, k,t disappears and these two covariances converge to one
another. Intuitively, going back to the result in Proposition 3, this implies that when a is large
enough, and there are a finite number of firms in industries, firms are more informed about their
own industry prices than the fundamentals of the economy. In the next subsection, I show how for
large a’s, it is these expectations that mainly drive the inflation in the economy.
Moreover, given the joint stochastic process of these signals, the best pricing response of a firm
36This in itself does not mean that the signal is more predictive of a firm’s competitors’ prices than the aggregate
economy since predictive power of a signal also depends on the volatility of the variable that is being predicted, and
industry prices are more volatile than the aggregate economy. However, as we showed in Proposition 3, once a gets
large enough, this difference is large enough so that firms end up with more information about their own industry price
changes than the fundamental.
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where (dt)•t=0 is a summable sequence.37 Intuitively, these dt ’s represent the confidence of the
agent on how informative each element of her information set is about the optimal price that she
would like to charge at time t. If a firms did not make mistakes, then the only signal that would
matter for it at time t would be S j,k,t = (1 a)qt +a p j, k,t(Stj, k), so that d0 = 1,dt = 0,8t   1.
However, making mistakes over time reduces the informativeness of a firm’s signals and it finds it
optimal to put some weight on their previous signals in setting their prices. Therefore, the more
uninformative the signals, the more persistent the response of firm’s prices would be to a shock
over time.
Given the result in this Proposition 5, solving the model reduces to finding the following fixed
point: a symmetric stationary equilibrium is a stationary joint stochastic process for signals of
firms, and a pricing strategy (d ⇤t )•t=0, such that for any firm whose competitors set their prices
according to this sequence, the firm finds it optimal to use (d ⇤t )•t=0 for setting its prices. Appendix
B lays out the computational algorithm that I use to solve for the joint stochastic process of signals
and pricing strategies.
4.6 Inflation Dynamics and the Phillips Curve
The following Proposition derives the Phillips curve of this economy.
Proposition 6. The Phillips curve of this economy is
pt = (1 a)E j,kt 1[Dqt ]+aE j,kt 1[p j, k,t ]+ (1 a)(22k  1)yt ,
37It is worth mentioning that these pricing strategies are not necessarily time independent, as the initial signal
structure of firms determines their initial prior about the state of the economy, and affects their prices for periods to
come. To get around this issue, in solving the model, I assume that the initial signal structure is such that these firms’
best pricing responses are stationary. This is equivalent to assuming that the game starts with an information structure
that corresponds to the steady state of firms’ attention allocation problem. For details, see Appendix B.
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where E j,kt 1[Dqt ] is the average expected growth of nominal demand at t  1, which is the sum of
inflation and output growth, Dqt = pt +Dyt , E j,kt 1[p j, k,t ] is the average expectation across firms
of their competitors’ price changes, and yt is the output gap.
The Phillips curve illustrates the main insight of this paper. In economies with high industry
level strategic complementarity (a close to 1), it is firms’ average expectation of their own-industry
price changes that drives aggregate inflation rather than their expectations of the growth in aggre-
gate demand.38 Moreover, Proposition 5 shows that with endogenous information acquisition, a
larger a also implies that firms learn more about the prices of their competitors relative to the
aggregate demand; an insight that is comparable with Proposition 3 in the static model. Therefore,
when a is large, not only is inflation driven more by firms’ expectations of their own industry
price changes, but also firms’ expectations are formed under information structures that are more
informative about their own industry price changes.
Additionally, the slope of the Phillips curve shows how these strategic complementarities, as
well as the capacity of processing information, affect monetary non-neutrality in this economy.
Higher capacity of processing information makes the Phillips curve steeper, such that in the limit
when k ! •, the Phillips curve is vertical. When firms have infinite attention, their estimates of
the fundamental as well as their competitors prices are also infinitely precise. Firms immediately
realize changes in the fundamental and react to it under the common knowledge that every other
firm is also doing so, which leads to complete monetary neutrality in the economy.
4.7 Calibration
Recall that the rational inattention problem of an industry is characterized by the following param-
eters: capacity of processing information for every firm, l = 1 2 2k 2 [0,1); the number of firms
38For comparison, we show in Afrouzi and Yang (2016) that in an economy with a measure of firms the Phillips
curve is in terms of the firms’ expectations of the aggregate inflation: pt = (1  a˜)Et 1[Dqt ] + a˜Et 1[pt ] + (1 
a˜)(22k   1)yt , where a˜ is the degree of across industry strategic complementarity. This is also comparable to a
Phillips curve with sticky information: pt = (1  a˜)Et 1[Dqt ] + a˜Et 1[pt ] + (1  a˜) l˜1 l˜ yt , where l˜ is the fraction
of firms that update their information in a given period. Notice that contrary to the result in this paper, in both these
Phillips curve inflation is directly related to firms’ average expectations of aggregate inflation.
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in the industry, K; and the degree of strategic complementarity a . Among these, the first two are
deep parameters of the model; but a is pinned down as a function of x ,h and K by the expression
in Proposition 4.
Table (V) shows the calibrated values of these parameters. I calibrate the elasticity of substitu-
tion within industry goods, h , to a value of 6 to match the average markup of 30%, reported by the
firms in the survey. A value of 6 for this parameter is also in line with the usual calibration in the
macroeconomics literature. Moreover, I set the number of competitors in industries to a baseline
value of 5, the average value reported by the firms weighted by their market share in the sample.
Finally, I calibrate the curvature of the elasticity of demand, x , to 40 in order to match an average
strategic complementarity of 0.9 as observed in the data. In addition, I calibrate the persistence of
the growth in nominal demand, r , to the persistence of the nominal GDP growth in New Zealand,
0.5.39
Calibrating the capacity of processing information has been a challenge in the rational inatten-
tion literature due to a lack of suitable data so far. However, the New Zealand survey allows me
to calibrate this parameter by directly measuring the quality of firms’ information about aggregate
inflation. I follow Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) to measure the degree of information rigid-
ity in forecasts of aggregate inflation from the data by regressing the forecast revisions of firms on
their forecast errors, and then taking the calibration of other parameters as given I find that l = 0.7
generates the same coefficient within the model.
A value of 0.7 is relatively large and represents a relatively small degree of information rigidity,
especially compared to the current models of noisy information, which usually assume calibrations
that imply lower Kalman gains. The empirical literature has also estimated values that are less than
0.7. For instance, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) estimate a Kalman gain of 0.5. This model,
however, does not need a low value for l to match the high degree of aggregate information
rigidity due to its endogenous propagation mechanism. Despite a high l at the micro level, firms
spend a large portion of their attention tracking the mistakes of their competitors and the portion
39I restrict the time series to post 1991 data to be consistent with New Zealand’s shift in monetary policy towards
inflation targeting in that time frame.
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that is allocated to tracking aggregate fundamentals is therefore significantly lower. Simply put,
firms devote a lot of attention to tracking their optimal prices, even more than what professional
forecasters do for inflation. However, since they do not directly care about aggregate inflation,
their forecasts manifests a high degree of rigidity.
5 The Aggregate Implications of Strategic Inattention
The main driving force of my analysis so far has been the effect of a firm’s number of competitors
on their information acquisition incentives. In this section, I further this analysis by investigating
how competition affects the propagation of monetary policy shocks to inflation and output through
these incentives.
For different values of K, Figure (IV) shows the impulse responses of inflation and output to a
one percent shock to the growth of nominal demand. When the shock hits the economy, firms do
not observe it directly. Instead, they observe a signal that is different from its expected value based
on their prior – in other words, they become surprised by their signals. From the perspective of
the firms, however, this surprise could come from any combination of three independent sources:
a change in the fundamental, a mistake on the part of their competitors, or an idiosyncratic mistake
on their own part that is orthogonal to the first two sources. It is the different incentives of firms in
responding to each of these sources that creates monetary non-neutrality. While firms would like
to respond to any changes in the first two sources, to each to a different degree, they do not want
to change their prices if the surprise is due to a mistake on their own part. Hence, reluctant about
the source of the shock, firms respond to their surprises in a probabilistic manner, and change their
prices on average by less than the increase in nominal demand, which leads to a muted inflation
response. Furthermore, the wedge between the increase in nominal demand and the increase in
nominal prices creates an excess real demand in the economy that is met with an increase in
production in the equilibrium. Thus, output rises on impact.
In contrast to the static model, which is equivalent to the dynamic one if shocks were i.i.d. over
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time, firms observe more and more signals as time passes and update their beliefs about the origin
of the shock. Since each of the possible sources for the shock leads to a different persistence in
the surprises that firms observe in their signals, firms are able to recognize the source of the shock
over time, and adjust their prices accordingly. Consequently, after a sufficient number of periods,
firms tune their prices perfectly to the change in nominal demand, inflation goes back to zero as
prices converge to their new level, and the real excess demand disappears along with output falling
back to its initial level.
The figure also shows how higher levels of competition affect the non-neutrality of money in
a very significant fashion. Compared to the case of monopolistic competition, which corresponds
to K! • in this model, the persistence of output and inflation as well as their on impact response
are more than doubled under the calibration of K. The effects are so significant that doubling
competition from 5 to 10 competitors at the micro-level decreases the half-life of output response to
the shock by 32% and reduces its impact response by 18%. The effects on the response of inflation
are similarly profound. A two-fold increase in the number of competitors at the micro-level reduces
the half-life of inflation response by 32% and increases its on impact response by 65%.40 These
large quantitative effects of competition reflect two distinct channels through which competition
alters economic outcomes. The first channel is the attention reallocation effect that competition
has in the optimal attention allocation of firms given a fixed degree of strategic complementarity
in pricing. As the number of competitors increase and the law of large numbers start to hold for
the mistakes of a firm’s competitors, the firm worries less about those mistakes and shifts their
attention to tracking the fundamental shocks. Moreover, the dependence of a to K implies that
the number of firms in industries also changes the equilibrium distribution of prices through a
second channel, to which I will refer as the strategic complementarity in pricing effect. Given any
information structure, higher competition alters the super-elasticities of firms’ demand functions
and eliminates the dependence of their profits to the prices of other firms which affects how firms
40This can also be translated into implications for cyclicality of markups as markups in this model are equal to the
ratio of aggregate price to nominal aggregate demand. The model therefore predicts that markups are counter-cyclical
and that the prices of less competitive firms are more rigid. This is consistent with Barro and Tenreyro (2006) who
find that the relative prices of less competitive goods move countercyclically.
39
use their information in setting their prices.
While these two channels affect the impulse response functions of the model in the same direc-
tion, from an economic perspective they are different in nature. The reallocation channel is novel
to the literature and characterizes an effect that has been absent in previous models due to the as-
sumption that every firm interacts with a measure of others, which in this paper correspond to the
case where K! •. The strategic complementarity in pricing channel is also new in the sense that
it micro-founds the dependence of strategic complementarity to the number of competitors within
every industry, but the effects of different levels of strategic complementarity on the propagation of
monetary policy shocks in models of information rigidity has already been pointed out in the litera-
ture by seminal work of Mankiw and Reis (2002); Woodford (2003a); Mac´kowiak and Wiederholt
(2009). Therefore, the contribution of this paper in pointing out this latter channel is mainly link-
ing the strategic complementarity to the number of a firms’ competitors by micro-founding it. For
the rest of this section I decompose the impulse responses of the model to investigate each of these
channels separately.
5.1 The Attention Reallocation Effects of Competition
For several values of K, Figure (V) shows the impulse responses of inflation and output in the econ-
omy to a one percent shock to the growth of nominal aggregate demand, fixing the value of strategic
complementarity in pricing to its baseline calibration value of 0.9. By fixing this value, here I have
shut down how K affects the strategic complementarity in setting prices, and the impulse responses
represent only the attention reallocation effects of competition through how it affects the informa-
tional choices of firms. Again, higher number of firms within industries corresponds to a lower
degree of monetary non-neutrality such that compared to the case of monopolistic competition
inflation response is 40% smaller on impact and its half-life is 15% longer. Furthermore, output
response is 33% larger on impact and its half-life is 12% longer.
The reason for this relates to equilibrium incentives of firms in allocating their attention within
their industries. When the economy is less competitive – K is small – firms are more worried
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about the mistakes of their competitors and allocate a high amount of attention to tracking those
mistakes. Since mistakes are orthogonal to the elements of the fundamental, when all of the firms
in the economy spend more resources to learning the mistakes of their competitors, they know less
about the fundamental. The incentive of learning others’ mistakes diminishes with competition
within industries. When every firm in the economy competes with a large number of competitors,
it is confident that the mistakes of others wash out, and allocates more attention to learning the
fundamental of the economy. As a result, in a more competitive economy, firms pay more attention
to the fundamental and learn it more quickly than firms in a less competitive economy. When firms
pay less attention to the fundamental over time by paying more attention to the mistakes of their
competitor, it takes them more time to learn the fundamental through their signals. Thus, it takes
longer for such firms to learn the shock and perfectly adjust their prices with respect to it, which
then directly leads to more persistent responses of output and inflation to the shock.
5.2 The Strategic Complementarity Channel
For several values of K, Figure (VI) shows the impulse responses of inflation and output in the
economy to a one percent shock to the growth of aggregate demand only in response to the strate-
gic complementarity channel. I shut down the attention reallocation channel by assuming that
firm’s pay all their attention to the fundamental, which is as if K ! • in information acquisition
problem of the firms. However, I let competition determine the strategic complementarity of firms
in pricing.41 As pointed out in the previous literature, higher competition significantly attenuates
the non-neutrality of money, here only through lowering the degree of strategic complementarity
in pricing. Relative to the case of monopolistic competition inflation response is 40% smaller on
impact and its half-life is 16% longer. Moreover, output response is 50% larger on impact and its
half-life is 36% longer.
Here firms are not paying any direct attention to their competitors’s beliefs, and even though
41The implied values of strategic complementarity in pricing for K = 5,10 and K! • are 0.9, 0.8 and 0, respec-
tively.
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the strategic complementarity in pricing relates their profits to those of their competitors, they have
to form beliefs over their competitors’ prices only through what they know about the fundamental.
The more strategic complementarity there is, the less firms can rely on their information as their
higher order beliefs about their competitors become more and more important. Thus, firms with
lower number of competitors, because of the higher degree of strategic complementarity are more
reluctant in responding to monetary policy shocks, and it takes them longer to fully adjust their
prices to changes in nominal demand, making inflation more persistent. As a result output responds
more strongly in such economies and its persistent is higher as firms take more time to adjust their
prices.
6 Concluding Remarks
Managing aggregate inflation expectations has been at the center of monetary policy makers’ at-
tention not only for controlling inflation but also as a potential instrument after the onset of the zero
lower bound during the Great Recession. However, the expectations of price setters from aggre-
gate inflation are highly biased and volatile in countries that have had low and stable inflation for
decades, which goes against the close relationship that baseline monetary models predict between
the two. Not only do these unanchored inflation expectations pose a serious challenge in recon-
ciling standard models with the empirical evidence, but also render the unconventional monetary
policies that aim on managing them ineffective.
In this paper, I develop a model to address this puzzle and show that what matters mainly for
price setters is their expectations of their own industry inflation rather than aggregate inflation.
Managers of firms do not directly care about aggregate inflation and are mainly concerned with
how their own competitors change their prices in the face of a shock. In fact, when allowed to
choose their information structure, managers are willing to sacrifice information about the aggre-
gate economy by shifting their attention towards learning their competitors’ prices. As a result,
they are more informed about their optimal prices than what their expectations of aggregate infla-
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tion would suggest.
Moreover, I show that these endogenous informational incentives have significant implications
for the propagation of monetary policy shocks. A two-fold increase in the number of competitors
that a firm faces at the micro level from the calibrated value of 5 to 10 decreases the half-lives of
output and inflation responses to a monetary policy shock by 32%. The impact effects are similarly
large. Doubling the number of competitors for every firm increases the impact response of inflation
to a monetary policy shock by 65% and decreases the impact response of output by 18%.
The results of this paper provide valuable insights for policy makers. On the one hand, the
fact that aggregate inflation is not the primary concern of firms implies that unanchored inflation
expectations are not necessarily a problem for monetary policy. After all, the main objective of
inflation targeting is to stabilize inflation, and in doing so, it eliminates it as a concern for economic
agents. Therefore, the fact that firms do not have to track it closely when it is low and stable is in
itself a success for monetary policy. On the other hand, this implies that managing expectations of
aggregate inflation is neither an effective tool for controlling inflation nor necessarily a powerful
instrument for policies such as forward guidance. These expectations are relatively unimportant
for firms and do not have much impact on their pricing decisions.
Nevertheless, this result does not necessarily rule out policies that target managing expecta-
tions, but rather provides a new perspective on how those policies should be framed and which
expectations they should target. An important takeaway from this paper is that for such a policy
to be successful, it has to communicate the course of monetary policy to price setters not in terms
of how it will steer the overall prices but in terms of how it will effect their own industry prices.
In other words, framing policy in terms of the aggregate variables will not gain as much attention
and response from firms as it would if the news about the policy were to reach them in terms of




A Proofs for the Static Model
This section formalizes the static game in Section 2. The Appendix is organized as follows. I
start by specifying the Shannon mutual information function in Subsection A.1. Subsection A.2
defines the concept of richness for a set of available information, and characterizes such a set. The
main idea behind having a rich set of available information is to endow firms with the freedom
of choosing their ideal signals given their capacity. Following this, Subsection A.3 proves the op-
timality of linear pricing strategies given Gaussian signals, and Subsection A.4 proves that when
the set of available signals is rich all firms prefer to see a single signal. Subsection A.5 shows that
any equilibrium has an equivalent in terms of the joint distribution it implies for prices among the
strategies in which all firms observe a single signal, and derives the conditions that such signals
should satisfy. Subsection A.6 shows that the equilibrium is unique given this equivalence rela-
tionship. Subsection A.7 derives an intuitive reinterpretation of a firm’s attention problem that is
discussed in Section 2. Subsection A.8 contains the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 as well as
the proof for Corollary 1.
A.1 Shannon’s Mutual Information
In information theory a mutual information function is a function that measures the amount of
information that two random variables reveal about one another. In this paper following the ra-
tional inattention literature, I use Shannon’s mutual information function for the attention con-
straint of the firms, which is defined as the reduction in entropy that the firm experiences given
its signal.42 In case of Gaussian variables, this function takes a simple and intuitive form. Let
(X ,Y ) ⇠ N (µ,
264 SX SX ,Y
SY,X SY
375). Then, the mutual information between X and Y is given by
42In his seminal paper Shannon (1948) showed that under certain axioms there is a unique entropy function.
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I (X ;Y ) = 12 log2(
det(SX )
det(SX |Y )
), where SX |Y = SX  SX ,YS 1Y SY,X is the variance of X conditional on
Y . Intuitively, the mutual information is bigger if the Y reveals more information about X , leading
to a smaller det(SX |Y ). In the other extreme case where X ? Y , then SX |Y = SX and I (X ;Y ) = 0,
meaning that if X is independent of Y , then observing Y does not change the posterior of an agent
about X and therefore reveals no information about X .
A result from information theory that I will use for proving the optimality of single signals is
the data processing inequality. The following lemma proves a weak version of this inequality for
completeness.
Lemma 1. Let X ,Y and Z be three random variables such that X ? Z|Y .43 Then I (X ;Y )  
I (X ;Z).
Proof. By the chain rule for mutual information44I (X ;(Y,Z))=I (X ;Y )+I (X ;Z|Y )=I (X ;Z)+




A.2 A Rich Set of Available Information
Definition. Let S be a set of Gaussian signals. We say S is rich if for any mean-zero possibly
multivariate Gaussian distributionG, there is a vector of signals inS that are distributed according
to G.
To specify a rich information structure, suppose in addition to q ⇠N (0,1) there are count-
ably many independent sources of randomness in the economy, meaning that there is a set B ⌘
{q,e1,e2, . . .} such that 8i 2 N,ei ⇠ N (0,1),ei ? q and 8{i, j} ⇢ N, j 6= i, e j ? ei. Let S
be the set of all finite linear combinations of the elements of B with coefficients in R:S =
{a0q+ÂNi=1 aies(i),N 2N,(ai)Ni=0⇢RN+1,(s(i))Ni=1⇢N}.We letS denote the set of all available
signals in the economy.
43This forms a Markov chain: X ! Y ! Z.
44For a formal definition of the chain rule see Cover and Thomas (2012).
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Lemma 2. S is rich.
Proof. Suppose G is a mean-zero Gaussian distribution. Thus, G =N (0,S), where S 2 RN⇥N
is a positive semi-definite matrix for some N 2 N. Since S is positive semi-definite, by Spectral
theorem there exists A2RN⇥N such that S= A0 ⇥A. Choose any N elements ofB, and let e be the
vector of those elements. Then e⇠N (0,IN⇥N) where IN⇥N is the N dimensional identity matrix.
By definition of S , S ⌘ A0e 2 S . Now notice that E[S] = 0, var(S) = A0var(e)A = S. Hence,
S⇠N (0,S) = G.
Definition. For a vector of non-zero Gaussian signals S⇠ N (0,S), we say elements of S are
distinct if S is invertible. In other words, elements of S are distinct if no two signals in S are
perfectly correlated.
Corollary 2. Let S be an N-dimensional vector of non-zero distinct signals whose elements are
in S . Let G = N (0,S) be the distribution of S. Then for any N + 1 dimensional Gaussian
distribution, Gˆ, one of whose marginals is G, there is at least one signal sˆ in S , such that Sˆ =
(S, sˆ)⇠ Gˆ.
Proof. Suppose Gˆ =N (0, Sˆ), where Sˆ 2 R(N+1)⇥(N+1) is a positive semi-definite matrix. Since




375. If x = 0, then let sˆ = 0 ⇠N (0,0) and we are done with the proof. If not,
notice that since Sˆ is positive semi-definite, its determinant has to be positive: det(Sˆ) = det(xS 
yy0)   0. Since elements of S are distinct, S is invertible. Also x > 0. We can write det(Sˆ) =
det(xS)det(IN⇥N   x 1S 1yy0)   0, which implies det(IN⇥N   x 1S 1yy0) = 1  x 1y0S 1y  
0, x   y0S 1y, where the equality is given by Sylvester’s determinant identity. Now, choose
eN+1 2B such that eN+1 ? S. Such an eN+1 exists because all the elements of S are finite linear
combinations of B and therefore are only correlated with a finite number of its elements, while
B has countably many elements.45 Let sˆ ⌘ y0S 1S+
264 px y0S 1y
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375eN+1. Notice that sˆ 2S
45In fact, there are countably many elements inB that are orthogonal to S.
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as it is a finite linear combination of the elements ofB. Notice that cov(sˆ,S) = y and var(sˆ) = x.
Hence, (sˆ,S)⇠N (0, Sˆ).
A.3 Optimality of Linear Pricing Strategies
Every firm chooses a vector of signals S j,k 2S n j,k , where n j,k 2N is the number of signals that j,k
chooses to observe, and a pricing strategy p j,k : S j,k ! R that maps their signal to a price. Thus,
the set of firm j,k’s pure strategies is
A j,k = {V j,k|V j,k = (S j,k 2S n j,k , p j,k : S j,k ! R),n j,k 2 N}.
The set of pure strategies for the game is A = {V |V = (V j,k) j,k2J⇥K,V j,k 2A j,k,8 j,k 2 J⇥K}.
First, I show that in any equilibrium it has to be the case that firms’ play linear pricing strategies
are linear in their signals.
Lemma 3. Take a strategy V = (S j,k, p j,k) j,k2J⇥K 2 A . Then if V is an equilibrium, then 8 j,k 2
J⇥K, p j,k =M0j,kS j,k for some Mj,k 2 Rn j,k .
Proof. A necessary condition for V to be an equilibrium is if given (S j,k) j,k2J⇥K under V , 8 j,k 2
J⇥K, p j,k solves p j,k(S j,k) = argminp j,kE[(p j,k (1 a)q a 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l(S j,l))2|S j,k]. Since the
objective is convex, the sufficient for minimization is if the first order condition holds: p⇤j,k(S j,k) =
(1  a˜)E[q|S j,k] + a˜E[p⇤j(S j)|S j,k], where a˜ ⌘
a+ aK 1
1+ aK 1
< 1, and p⇤j(S j) ⌘ K 1Âk2K p⇤j,k(S⇤j,k).
Thus, by iteration p⇤j,k(S j,k) = limM!•((1  a˜)ÂMm=0 a˜mE(m)j,k [q] + a˜M+1E(M+1)j,k [p⇤j(S j)]) where
E(0)j,k [q]⌘ E[q|S j,k] is firm j,k’s expectation of the fundamental, and 8m  1,




is firm j,k’s m’th order higher order belief of its industry’s average expectation of the fundamental.
Similarly E(M+1)j,k [p⇤j(S j)] is firm j,k’s M+ 1’th order belief of their industry price. Assuming
for now that signals are such that expectations are finite, since a˜ < 1, the later term in the limit
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converges to zero and we have:46





Now, I just need to show that E(m)j,k [q] is linear in S j,k, for all m. To see this, since all signals in
S are Gaussian and mean zero, 8 j,k, let Sq,S j,k ⌘ cov(S j,k,q) = E[qS0j,k]. Also given j,k, 8l 6= k,
SS j,l ,S j,k = cov(S j,k,S j,l) = E[S j,lS0j,k] and SS j,k = var(S j,k) = E[S j,kS0j,k].
The proof for linearity of higher order expectations is by induction: notice that for m = 0,
E(0)j,k [q] = E[q|S j,k] = Sq,S j,kS 1S j,kS j,k,which implies 0’th order expectations of firms are linear in
their signals. Now suppose 8 j, l E(m)j,l [q] = Aj,l(m)0S j,l for some Aj,l(m) 2Rn j,l . Now, E(m+1)j,k [q] =
K 1(Aj,l(m)+Â
l 6=k
A j,l(m)SS j,l ,S j,kS
 1
S j,k)| {z }
⌘A(m+1)j,k 2Rn j,k
0S j,k. The fact that I have assumed SS j,k is invertible is with-
out loss of generality, because if S j,k is not invertible, since all signals in S j,k are non-zero then
it must be the case that S j,k contains co-linear signals. In that case we can exclude the redundant
signals without changing the posterior of the firm.
Corollary 3. If V = (S j,k 2S n j,k , p j,k(S j,k) =M0j,kS j,k) j,k2J⇥K 2A is an equilibrium, then 8 j,k 2
J⇥K, Mj,k = ((1 a)Sq,S j,kS 1S j,k +a 1K 1Âl 6=kSS j,l ,S j,kS 1S j,k)0.
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 3 that if V is an equilibrium then pricing strategies should satisfy
the following optimality condition:
Mj,kS j,k = (1 a)E[q|S j,k]+a 1K 1Âl 6=k
E[M0j,lS j,l|S j,k].
Thus,Mj,k = ((1 a)Sq,S j,kS 1S j,k +a 1K 1Âl 6=kSS j,l ,S j,kS 1S j,k)0.
Given the results in this section, I restrict the set of strategies to those with linear pricing
schemes that sarisfy Corollary 3:A ⇤ = {V 2A |V satisfies Corollary 3}.
46if expectations are not finite, then a best response in pricing does not exist. However, since we are characterizing
a necessary condition in this lemma, I characterize the best pricing responses conditional on existence.
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A.4 The Attention Problem of Firms
Take a strategy V 2 A ⇤ such that V = (S j,k 2S n j,k , p j,k = M0j,kS j,k) j,k2J⇥K. For ease of notation
let p(V j,k) ⌘ M0j,kS j,k, 8 j,k 2 J ⇥K. Also, let V ( j,k) ⌘ V\V j,k. Moreover, for any given firm
j,k 2 J⇥K, let q j,k(V ( j,k)) ⌘ (q,(p(V j,l))l 6=k,(p(Vm,n))m 6= j,n2K)0 be the augmented vector of the
fundamental, the prices of other firms in j,k’s industry, and the prices of all other firms in the econ-
omy. Define w ⌘ (1 a, a




, 0,0,0, . . . ,0| {z }
(J 1)⇥K times
)0. Also, for any Vˆ j,k 2 A j,k, let S(Vˆ j,k)
denote the signals in S that j,k observes under the strategy Vˆ j,k. Given this notation observe that
firm j,k’s problem, as defined in the text, reduces to
min
Vˆ j,k2A j,k
L j,k(Vˆ j,k,V ( j,k))⌘ E[(p(Vˆ j,k) w0q j,k(V ( j,k)))2|S(Vˆ j,k)] (9)
s.t. I (S(Vˆ j,k);q j,k(V ( j,k))) k,
where given the joint distribution of (S(Vˆ j,k),q j,k(V ( j,k))), the mutual information is defined in
Section A.1. It is also useful to restate the definition of the equilibrium given this notation:
Definition. An equilibrium is a strategy V 2A such that 8 j,k 2 J⇥K
V j,k = argminV 0j,k2A j,kL j,k(V
0
j,k,V ( j,k)) s.t.I (S(V j,k);q j,k(V ( j,k))) k. (10)
The solution to this problem, if exists, is not unique. To show this, I define the following
relation on the deviations of j,k, given a strategy V 2A ⇤, and show that it is an equivalence.
Definition. For any two distinct elements {V1j,k,V2j,k}⇢A j,k, and given V = (V j,k,V ( j,k))2A ⇤, we
say V1j,k ⇠ j,k|V V2j,k if Lj,k(V1j,k,V ( j,k)) = Lj,k(V2j,k,V ( j,k)), where Lj,k(., .) is defined as in Equation
(9). Note that 8 j,k 2 J⇥K and 8V 2A ⇤,⇠ j,k|V is an equivalence relation as reflexivity, symmetry
and transitivity are trivially satisfied by properties of equality.
By definition the agent is indifferent between elements of an equivalence class. Now, given
V = (V j,k,V ( j,k)) 2 A ⇤, let [Vˆ j,k]V ⌘ {V 0j,k 2 A j,k|V 0j,k ⇠ j,k|V Vˆ j,k}. The following lemma shows
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there is always a deviation with a single dimensional signal that requires less attention.
Lemma 4. For any j,k 2 J⇥K, 8V = (V j,k,V ( j,k)) 2 A ⇤, 9Vˆ j,k 2 [V j,k]V such that the agent ob-
serves only one signal under Vˆ j,k and I (S(Vˆ j,k);q j,k(V ( j,k)))  I (S(V j,k);q j,k(V ( j,k))). More-
over, Vˆ j,k does not alter the covariance of firm j,k’s price with the fundamental and the prices of
all other firms in the economy under V .
Proof. I prove this lemma by constructing such an strategy. Given V 2A ⇤, let SV j,k ⌘ var(S(V j,k)),
Sq j,k,V j,k ⌘ cov(q j,k(V ( j,k)),S(V j,k)) and Sq j,k ⌘ var(q j,k(V ( j,k))). Thus, (S(V j,k),q j,k(V ( j,k))) ⇠
N (0,
264 SV j,k S0q j,k,V j,k
Sq j,k,V j,k Sq j,k
375). Moreover, since V 2A ⇤, then pricing strategies are linear, and by
Corollary 3 p j,k(V) = w0E[q j,k(V ( j,k))|S(V j,k)] = w0Sq j,k,V j,kS 1V j,kS(V j,k). Notice that
Lj,k(V j,k,V ( j,k)) = w0var(q j,k(V ( j,k))|S(V j,k))w= w0Sq j,kw w0Sq j,k,V j,kS 1V j,kS0q j,k,V j,kw.
Now, let sˆ j,k ⌘w0Sq j,k,V j,kS 1V j,kS(V j,k). Clearly, sˆ j,k 2S as it is a finite linear combination of the
elements of S j,k, andS is rich. Define Vˆ j,k ⌘ (sˆ j,k,1) 2A j,k. Notice that
Lj,k(Vˆ j,k,V ( j,k)) = w0var(q j,k(V ( j,k))|sˆ j,k)w= Lj,k(V j,k,V ( j,k)).
Thus, Vˆ j,k 2 [V j,k]V . Also, observe that q j,k(V ( j,k)) ? sˆ j,k|S(V j,k). Therefore, by the data process-
ing inequality in Lemma 1, I (sˆ j,k;q j,k(V ( j,k))) I (S(V j,k);q j,k(V ( j,k))). Finally, observe that
p j,k(Vˆ j,k,V ( j,k)) = p j,k(V) =w0Sq j,k,V j,kS 1V j,kS(V j,k). Thus, the covariance of j,k’s price with all the
elements of q j,k(V ( j,k)) remains unchanged when j,k deviates from V j,k to Vˆ j,k.
A.5 Equilibrium Signals
Let E ⌘ {V 2 A |V is an equilibrium as stated in Statement (10)} denote the set of equilibria for
the game. The following definition states an equivalence relation among the equilibria.
Definition. Suppose {V1,V2} ⇢ E . We say V1 ⇠E V2 if they imply the same joint distribution for
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prices of firms and the fundamental. Formally, V1 ⇠E V2 if given that (q, p j,k(V1)) j,k2J⇥K ⇠G, then
(q, p j,k(V2)) j,k2J⇥K ⇠ G as well. This is trivially an equivalence relation as it satisfies reflexivity,
symmetry and transitivity by properties of equality.
Lemma 5. Let A ⇤⇤ ⌘ {V 2 A |V = (s j,k 2S ,1) j,k2J⇥K}. Suppose V 2 A is an equilibrium for
the game. Then, there exists Vˆ 2A ⇤⇤ such that Vˆ ⇠E V .
Proof. The proof is by construction. Since V is an equilibrium it solves all firms problems. Start
from the first firm in the economy and perform the following loop for all firms: we know firm
1,1 has a strategy Vˆ1,1 = (s1,1 2 S ,1) that is equivalent to V1,1 given V . Create a new strategy
V1,1 = (Vˆ1,1,V (1,1)). We know that V1,1 implies the same joint distribution as V for the prices of all
firms in the economy because we have only changed firm 1,1’s strategy, and by the previous lemma
Vˆ1,1 does not alter the the joint distribution of prices. Now notice that V1,1 is also an equilibrium
because (1) firm 1,1 was indifferent between V1,1 and Vˆ1,1 and (2) the problem of all other firms
has not changed because 1,1’s price is the same under both strategies. Now, repeat the same thing
for firm 1,2 given V1,1 and so on. At any step given V j,k repeat the process for j,k+1 (or j+1,1
if k = K) until the last firm in the economy. At the last step, we have V J,K = (Vˆ j,k) j,k2J⇥K , which
is (1) an equilibrium and (2) implies the same joint distribution among prices and fundamentals as
V . Moreover, notice that V J,K 2A ⇤⇤.
So far we have shown that any equilibrium has an equivalent in A ⇤⇤, so as long as we are
interested in the joint distribution of prices and the fundamental it suffices to only look at equilibria
in this set. The next lemma shows that given any strategy V 2A ⇤⇤, for any j,k 2 J⇥K, the set of
j,k’s deviations is equivalent to choosing a joint distribution between their price and q j,k(V ( j,k)).
Lemma 6. Suppose V 2 A ⇤⇤ is an equilibrium. Then, 8 j,k 2 J⇥K, any deviation for j,k is
equivalent to a Gaussian joint distribution between their price and q j,k(V ( j,k)). Moreover, if two
different deviations of j,k imply the same joint distribution for prices and the fundamental, they
both require the same amount of attention and the firm is indifferent between.
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Proof. Given V , let Sq j,k be such that q j,k(V ( j,k)) ⇠N (0,Sq j,k). Notice that Sq j,k has to be in-
vertible: if not, then there must a firm whose signal is either co-linear with the fundamental or
the signal of another firm, meaning that their signal is perfectly correlated with one of those. But
that violates the capacity constraint of that firm as they are processing infinite capacity, which is a
contradiction with the assumption that V is an equilibrium.47
Now, from Lemma 4 we know that it suffices to look at deviations of the form (s j,k 2S ,1).
First, observe that any deviation of the firm j,k creates a Gaussian joint distribution for (s j,k,q j,k(V ( j,k)))
as s j,k 2S . Moreover, suppose G=N (0,
264 x y0
y Sq j,k
375) is a Gaussian distribution. Since Sq j,k is
invertible, Corollary 2 implies that there is a signal s j,k 2S , such that (s j,k,q j,k(V ( j,k)))⇠ G.
For the last part of the lemma, suppose for two different signals s1j,k and s
2
j,k inS , (s
1
j,k,q j,k(V ( j,k)))
and (s2j,k,q j,k(V ( j,k))) have the same joint distribution. Then,
var(q j,k(V ( j,k))|s1j,k) = var(q j,k(V ( j,k))|s2j,k)
which implies that Lj,k((s1j,k,1),V ( j,k)) = Lj,k((s2j,k,1),V ( j,k)). Moreover, given that the condi-
tional variances under both signals are the same we haveI (s1j,k;q j,k(V ( j,k)))=I (s2j,k;q j,k(V ( j,k))).
Therefore, the firm is indifferent between s1j,k and s
2
j,k.
This last lemma ensures us that instead of considering all the possible deviations inS , we can
look among all the possible joint distributions. If there is a joint distribution that solves a firm’s
problem, then the lemma implies that there is a signal in the set of available signals that creates
that joint distribution.
Lemma 7. Suppose V = (s⇤j,k 2S ,1) 2A ⇤⇤ is an equilibrium, then 8 j,k 2 J⇥K,
s⇤j,k = lw0q j,k(V ( j,k))+ z j,k, z j,k ? q j,k(V ( j,k)), var(z j,k) = l (1 l )var(w0q j,k(V ( j,k))).
47Recall, for any two one dimensional Normal random variables X and Y , I(X ,Y ) =  12 log2(1 r2X ,Y ), where rX ,Y
is the correlation of X and Y . Notice that limr2!1 I(X ,Y )!+•.
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Proof. For firm j,k 2 J⇥K, let Sq j,k denote the covariance matrix of q j,k(V ( j,k)). From Lemma 4
it is sufficient to look at deviations of the form (s j,k 2S ,1). For a given s j,k 2S , (s j,k,q j,k(V ( j,k)))⇠
N (0,Ss j,k,q j,k), where Ss j,k,q j,k =
264 x2 y0
y Sq j,k
375 ⌫ 0. First, recall that for (s j,k 2S ,1) to be opti-
mal, it has to be the case that p j,k = w0E[q j,k(V ( j,k))|s j,k] = x 2w0ys j,k. Thus,
x2 = w0y.
Now, given s j,k 2S , the firm’s loss in profits is var(w0q j,k(V ( j,k))|s j,k) = w0Sq j,kw  x 2(w0y)2
and the capacity constraint is 12 log2(|I x 2S 1q j,kyy0|)  k, x 2y0S 1q j,ky l ⌘ 1 2 2k . More-
over, from the previous lemma we know that for any (x,y) such that
264 x2 y0
y Sq j,k
375⌫ 0, then there
is a signal inS that creates this joint distribution. Therefore, we let the agent choose (x,y) freely
to solve min(x,y)w0Sq j,kw  x 2(w0y)2 s.t. x 2y0S 1q j,ky  l . The solution can be derived by tak-








q j,ky) x 2(w0Sq j,kw)(y0S 1q j,ky). Therefore,
w0Sq j,kw  x2(w0y)2   (w0Sq j,kw)(1  x 2y0Sq j,ky)  (1 l )w0Sq j,kw,
where, the last line is from the capacity constraint. This defines a global lower-bound for the ob-
jective of the firm that holds for any choice of (x,y). However, this global minimum is attained if
both the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the capacity constraint bind. From the properties of the






q j,kw for some constant
c0. Therefore, there is a unique vector x 1y that attains the global minimum of the agent’s prob-





Together with x2 = w0y, this gives us the unique (x,y):y = lSq j,kw, x =
q
lw0Sq j,kw. Finally, to
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find a signal that creates this joint distribution, choose s⇤j,k 2S such that
s⇤j,k = lw0q j,k(V ( j,k))+ z j,k, z j,k ? q j,k(V ( j,k)), var(z j,k) = l (1 l )w0Sq j,kw.
notice that cov(s⇤j,k,q j,k(V ( j,k))) = lSq j,kw, and var(s⇤j,k) = lw0Sq j,kw. Notice that this implies
the equilibrium set of signals are
s⇤j,k = l (1 a)q+la
1
K 1Âl 6=k
s⇤j,l + z j,k, z j,t ? (q,sm,n)(m,n) 6=( j,k)
where var(z j,t) = l (1 l )var((1 a)q+a 1K 1Âl 6=k s⇤j,l).
A.6 Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Joint Distribution of Prices
Having specified the equilibrium signals, I now show that all equilibria imply the same joint dis-
tribution of prices.
Lemma 8. Suppose a 2 [0,1). Then, E /⇠E is non-empty and a singleton.
Proof. I show this by directly characterizing the equilibrium. From previous section we know that
any equilibrium is equivalent to one in strategies of A ⇤⇤. Suppose that (s⇤j,k,1) j,k2J⇥K 2 A ⇤⇤ is
an equilibrium, and notice that in this equilibrium every firm simply sets their price equal to their
signal, p j,k ⌘ s⇤j,k. Also, Lemma 8 showed that this equilibrium signals should satisfy the following
p j,k = l (1 a)q+la 1K 1Âl 6=k
p j,l + z j,k, z j,k ? (q, pm,n)(m,n) 6=( j,k)
where var(z j,t) = l (1  l )var((1 a)q+a 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l). Now, we want to find all the joint
distributions for (q, p j,k) j,k2J⇥K that satisfy this rule. Since all signals are Gaussian, the joint
distributions will also be Gaussian.
I start by characterizing the covariance of any firm’s price with the fundamental. For any
industry j, let p j ⌘ (p j,k)k2K and z j ⌘ (z j,k)k2K ? q. Moreover, for ease of notation in this section
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let g ⌘ 1K 1 . Now, the equilibrium condition implies p j = l (1 a)1q+lag(110 I)p j+z j where
1 is the unit vector in RK , and I is identity matrix in RK⇥K (therefore 110   I is a matrix with zeros
on diagonal and 1’s elsewhere). With some algebra it is straight forward to show that cov(p j,q) =
l la
1 la 1. Thus, in any equilibrium, the covariance of any firm’s price with the fundamental q has be
to equal to d ⌘ l la1 la .
Next, I show that for any two firms in two different industries, their prices are orthogonal
conditional on the fundamental. Let p j be the vector of prices in industry j as defined above. Pick
any firm from any other industry l,m 2 J⇥K, l 6= j. Notice that by the equilibrium conditions
z j ? pl,m. Now, notice that
cov(p j, pl,m) = l (1 a)1cov(q, pl,m)| {z }
=d
+lag(110   I)cov(p j, pl,m)+ cov(z j, pl,m)| {z } .
=0
With some algebra, we get cov(p j, pl,m) = d 21) cov(p j, pl,m|q) = 0. Therefore, in any equilib-
rium prices of any two firms in two different industries are only correlated through the fundamental.
This implies that firms do not pay attention to mistakes of firms in other industries. Now we only
need to specify the joint distribution of prices within industries. We have p j = B(l (1 a)1q+ z j)
where B ⌘ 11+alg I+ alg(1+alg)(1 al )110. This gives p j = d1q+Bz j, where Bz j ? q. This cor-
responds to the decomposition of the prices of firms to parts that are correlated with the funda-
mental and their mistakes. The vector Bz j is the vector of firms’ mistakes in industry j, and
is the same as the vector v j in the text. Let Sz, j = cov(z j,z j) and Sp, j = cov(p j, p j). We have
Sp, j = d 2110+BSz, jB0. Also, since z j,k ? p j,l 6=k, we have D j ⌘ cov(p j,z j) = BSz, j where D j is a
diagonal matrix whose k’th element on the diagonal is var(z j,k). From the equilibrium conditions
we have
var(z j,k) = l (1 l )var((1 a)q+agÂ
l 6=k
p j,l)
= l (1 l )(1 a)2+l (1 l )a2g2w0kSp, jwk+2l (1 l )a(1 a)d
where wk is a vector such that w0k p j = Âl 6=k p j,l . This gives K linearly independent equations and
K unknowns in terms of the diagonal of D j. Guess that the unique solution to this is symmetric.








2,8 j,k, l 6= k,
where l˜ ⌘ l+agl1+agl .
A.7 Reinterpretation of a Firm’s Attention Problem.
Take any firm j,k 2 J⇥K, and suppose all other firms in the economy are playing the equilibrium
strategy. Moreover, here I take it as given that the firm does not pay attention to mistakes of firms
in other industries:cov(p j,k, pl,m|q)l 6= j = 0. Now, take strategy V j, k for other firms and decompose
the average price of others such that p j, k(V j, k) = 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l(V j,l) = dq+ v j, k, where d and
the joint var(v j, k) is implied by V j, k. Let s2v ⌘ var(v j, k) be the variance of the average mistake
of other firms in j,k’s industry when they play the strategy. For s j,k 2S , and define rq(s j,k) ⌘
cor(s j,k,q), rv(s j,k) ⌘ cor(s j,k,v j, k). Notice that firm j,k’s loss in profit given that they observe
s j,k is
var((1 a)q+a p j, k|s j,k) = (1 a+ad )2var(q+ a1 a(1 d )v j, k|s j,k).
With some algebra, it is straight forward to show that
var(q+
a
1 a(1 d )v j, k|s j,k) = 1+(
a
1 a(1 d ))




Now, to derive the information constraint in terms of the two correlations:I (s j,k;(q, p⇤j, k)) 
k , 12 log2( var(s j)var(s j,k|(q,p⇤j, k)))  k . Notice that
var(s j|(q,p⇤j, k))
var(s j)
= 1  (rq(s j)2+ rv(s j)2). Thus, the
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2 s.t.rq(s j,k)2+rv(s j,k)2  l .
The problem reduces to choosing correlations as the information set is rich: for any pair of
(rq,rv) 2 [ 1,1]2, there is a signal inS that generates that pair.
A.8 Proofs of Propositions for the Static Model
Here I include the proofs of Propositions 1 to 3. The proofs and derivations for Section 4 are
included in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 1.




= K 1+adK 1+al l . However, notice that d =
1 a
1 al l < l as long as
l > 0 and a > 0. This implies directly that r⇤2q < l . Thus, r⇤2v = l  r⇤2q > 0, meaning
that firms pay attention to the mistakes of their competitors.












(K 1)(d  l )+(K 1+al )a ∂d∂a
(K 1+ad )(K 1+al ) < 0.
The inequality comes from d  l < 0 and ∂d∂a = d l 1(1 a)(1 al ) < 0.
3. Shown in the proof of Lemma 8.
Proof of Proposition 2.
First of all notice that the aggregate price is given byp⌘ J 1K 1Â j,k2J⇥K p j,k = dq+ 1JK Â j,k2J⇥K v j,k.
Since J is large and v j,k’s are independent across industries, the average converges to zero by law
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of large numbers as J! •. Therefore, p = dq. Moreover, E j,k[p j, k] = cov(s j,k,p j, k)var(p j,k) s j,k = l˜ p j,k
and E j,k[p] = cov(s j,k,p)var(p j,k) p j,k =
1 al˜
1 al l p j,k where l˜ =
l (K 1)+al
K 1+al > l is defined as in the proof of
Lemma 8. So, E j,k[p j, k] = l˜ p, E j,k[p] = 1 al˜1 al l p. Finally,
cov(E j,k[p j, k], p) = l˜var(p)>
1 al˜
1 al lvar(p) = cov(E
j,k[p], p).
Also, if K! • then l˜ ! l and cov(E j,k[p], p)! cov(E j,k[p j, k], p).
Proof of Corollary 1.
Conditional on realization of the aggregate price |p E j,k[p]| = (1  1 al˜1 al l )|p| > (1  l˜ )|p| =
|p E j,k[p j, k]|.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Since knowledge is directly related to mutual information (as defined in Definition 3), and mu-
tual information in this static setting reduces to correlations, we need to show cor(p j,k, p j, k)  
cor(p j,k,q) = cor(p j,k, p). By plugging in the unique equilibrium distribution from the proof of
Lemma 8, we get this holds if and only if 1 al˜1 al l  (K 1)l˜
2
1+(K 2)l˜ . Moving the terms around, this can
be rearranged to al˜   12 ,meaning that the necessary and sufficient condition for the result is when
this inequality holds. Now, notice that if al   12 , since l˜   l , then al˜   12 . Hence, al   12 is a
sufficient condition.
B Derivations and Proofs for the Dynamic Model
The Appendix is organized as follows. Subsection B.1 extends the set of available information
defined in Appendix A.2 to the dynamic environment. Subsection B.2 includes all the derivations
for the dynamic model that are omitted in the main text. Subsection B.3 discusses the degree of
strategic complementarity implied by the Kimball aggregator. Subsection B.4 contains the proofs
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of the Propositions 4, 5 and 6. Subsection B.5 discusses the computational method that I use for
solving the dynamic model.
B.1 Available Information in the Dynamic Model
The set of available signals in the dynamic model is an extension of the one defined in Appendix
A.2. The main difference is the notion of time and the fact that at every period nature draws new
shocks and the set of available information in the economy expands. To capture this evolution,
I define a signal structure as a sequence of sets (S t)•t= • where S t s ⇢S t ,8s   0. Here, S t
denotes the set of available signals at time t, and it contains all the previous sets of signals that
were available in previous periods.
To construct the signal structure, suppose that at every period, in addition to the shock to the
nominal demand, the nature draws countably infinite uncorrelated standard normal noises. Similar
to Appendix A.2, let St be the set of all finite linear combinations of these uncorrelated noises.
Now, define S t = {Â•s=0 atet t |8t   0,at 2 R,et t 2St t},8t. First of all, notice that for all
t, qt 2S t , as it is a linear combination of all ut t ’s and ut t 2St t ,8t   0. This implies that
perfect information is available about the fundamental in the economy.
B.2 Derivations
Solution to Household’s Problem (4).
Let b tj1,t and b tj2,t be the Lagrange multipliers on household’s budget and aggregation con-
straints, respectively.
For ease of notation let C j,t ⌘ (Cj,1,t , . . . ,Cj,K,t) be the vector of household’s consumption
from firms in industry j 2 J, so thatCj,t ⌘F(C j,t). First, I derive the demand of the household for























j1,t Ct , where the equality under curly bracket is from Euler the-
orem for homogeneous functions as F(.) is CRS. Therefore, Pt ⌘ j2,tj1,t is the price of the aggregate
consumption basket Ct . Now, from Equation (11), P j,t ⌘ (Pj,1,t , . . . ,Pj,K,t) = — log(F( C j,tJ 1PtCt )).
I need to show that this function is invertible to prove that a demand function exists. For ease of
notation, define function f : RK ! RK such that f (x)⌘ — log(F(x)). Notice that f (.) is homoge-





F(x)   Fn(x)F(x) Fm(x)F(x) . Let 1 be the unit vector in RK . Since F(.) is symmet-
ric along its arguments, for any k 2 (1, . . . ,K), F1(1) = Fk(1), F11(1) = Fkk(1) < 0. Since F(.)
is homogeneous of degree 1, by Euler’s theorem we have F(1) = Âk2KFk(1) = KF1(1). Also,
sinceFk(.) is homogeneous of degree zero.48 Similarly we have 0= 0⇥Fk(1) =Âl2KFkl(1). So,
for any l 6= k, Fkl(1) =   1K 1F11(1) > 0. This last equation implies thatJ f (1) is an invertible
matrix.49 Therefore, by inverse function theorem f (.) is invertible in an open neighborhood around
1, and therefore any symmetric point x= x.1 such that x> 1. We can write C j,tJ 1PtCt = f
 1(P j,t). It
is straight forward to show that f 1(.) is homogeneous of degree -1 because f (x) is homogeneous
of degree -1: for any x 2 RK , f 1(ax) = f 1(a f ( f 1(x)) = f 1( f (a 1 f 1(x)) = a 1 f 1(x).
Now, Cj,k,t = J 1PtCt f 1k (P j,t), where f
 1
k (x) is the k’th element of the vector f
 1(P j,t). Fi-
nally, since f (.) is symmetric across its arguments, so is f 1(P j,t), meaning that f 1k (P j,t) =
f 11 (sk,1(P j,t)), where sk,1(P j,t) is a permutation that changes the places of the first and k’th
element of the vector P j,t . Now, to get the notation in the text let (Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t) ⌘ sk,1(P j,t)
andD(x)⌘ J 1 f 11 (x), which gives us the notation in the text:Cj,k,t = PtCtD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t), where
D(., .) is homogeneous of degree -1. Finally, the optimality conditions of the household’s problem
with respect to Bt ,Ct and Lt are straight forward and are given by PtCt = b (1+ it)E ft [Pt+1Ct+1] and
fPtCt =Wt .
48Follows from homogeneity of F(x). Notice that F(ax) = aF(x). Differentiate with respect to k’th argument to
get Fk(ax) =Fk(x).
49With some algebra, we can show that J f (1) = F11(1)K 1 I  F11(1)+K
 1
K(K 1) 11
0, meaning that J f (1) is a symmetric
matrix whose diagonal elements are strictly different than its off-diagonal elements. Hence, it is invertible.
60
Loss Function of the Firms.
Let P(Pj,k,t ,Pj k,t ,Wt) = (Pj,k,t   (1  s¯)Wt)D(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t) denote the profit function of the firm
following the text. Notice that this function is homogeneous of degree 1 asD(., .) is homogeneous
of degree -1. Now for any given set of signals over time that firm j,k could choose to see, its profit
maximization problem is max(Pj,k,t :Stj,k!R)•t=0E[Â
•
t=0b tQ0P(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt)|S 1j,k ]. Define the loss
function of firm from mispricing at a certain time as
L(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt)⌘P(P⇤j,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt) P(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt),
where P⇤j,k,t = argmaxxP(x,Pj, k,t ,Wt).Note that min(Pj,k,t :Stj,k!R)•t=0E[Â
•
t=0b tQ0L(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt)|S 1j,k ]
has the same solution as profit maximization problem of the firm because L(.) is also homogeneous
of degree 1 and Â•t=0b t
Q0
Qt maxxP(x,Pj, k,t ,Wt) is independent of (Pj,k,t)
•
t=0. Now, I take a second
order approximation toL [(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Qt ,Wt)•t=0]⌘Â•t=0b tQ0L(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt) around a sym-
metric point where 8t, Pj,k,t = Pj,l,t |8l 6=k = P¯,Wt = f Q¯ such that P¯ = argmaxxP(x, P¯,f). For any
of variables above let its corresponding small letter denote percentage deviation of that variable
from this symmetric point (qt ⌘ Qt Q¯Q¯ and so on). Observe that up to second order terms





















But notice that L(P¯, P¯,f Q¯)= 0, and p⇤j,k,t =
P⇤j,k,t P¯
P¯ is such thatP1(P
⇤










P(P¯, P¯,f Q¯)+wtf Q¯
∂ 2
∂Pj,k,t∂Wt
P(P¯, P¯,f Q¯)= 0.
Plug this into the above approximation to get L(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt) =   P¯22 P11(p j,k,t   p⇤j,k,t)2.





Â•t=0b t(p j,k,t  p⇤j,k,t)2,
which implies that up to this second order approximation the profit maximization of the firm is
equivalent to min(p j,k,t :Stj,k!R)•t=0E[Â
•
t=0b t(p j,k,t  p⇤j,k,t)2|S 1j,k ].
General Form of a .
To derive the expression for p⇤j,k,t , recall that P
⇤
j,k,t is such that P1(P⇤j,k,t ,Pj, k,t ,Wt) = 0. Consid-
ering the specific form of the profit function this gives P⇤j,k,t =
eD(P⇤j,k,t ,Pj, k,t)
eD(P⇤j,k,t ,Pj, k,t) 1(1  s¯)fQt where
eD(P⇤j,k,t ,Pj, k,t)⌘ ∂D(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t)∂Pj,k,t
Pj,k,t
D(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t) .Define the super-elasticity of demand for a firm as
eeD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t)⌘ Pj,k,teD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t)
∂
∂Pj,k,t eD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t). Since D(., .) is homogeneous of degree -1,
then eD(., .) and eeD(., .) are both homogeneous of degree zero. For ease of notation let eD⌘ eD(1,1)
and eeD ⌘ eeD(1,1). Now, recall from the previous section that p⇤j,k,t is a derived by a first order log-






Notice that a 2 [0,1) as long as eeD   0 which happens if and only if a firm’s elasticity of demand
is increase in their own-price.
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Derivation of Demand Given Elasticities.





























where 2F1(., .; .; .) is the hypergeometric function. This is also the particular solution to the above
PDE that coincides with the CES demand when x = 0. To see this, we use the identity 2F1(1,1;2;x)=
log(1 x)





). Given the solu-
tion to the PDE we can define the system of equations, (Cj,k,t)k2K = J 1QtD(Pj,k,t)k2K, and the
inverse of this function gives us a system of first order partial differential equations in terms of the
function F(.) as shown in derivations of household’s utility function.
B.3 Strategic Complementarity under Kimball Demand
In the main text of the paper, I consider a generalization of the elasticities under CES aggregator
and derive the strategic complementarities under this generalization. An alternative approach in
the literature is using Kimball aggregator, which is also a generalization of the CES aggregator. In
this section, I derive the demand functions of firms given this aggregator and show that the strategic
complementarity implied by these demand functions cannot satisfy all of the following properties
simultaneously: (1) there is weak strategic complementarity in pricing (0  a < 1), (2) there is
substantial strategic complementarity in the data (a = 0.9) and (3) strategic complementarity is
increasing with the elasticity of substitution within industries (∂a∂h   0).





F(Cj,1,t , . . . ,Cj,K,t)
), (13)
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where f (.) is at least thrice differentiable, and f (1) = 1 (so that F(1, . . . ,1) = K). Observe that
this coincides with the CES aggregator when f (x) = x
h 1
h . To derive the demand functions, recall












To invert these functions and get the demand for every firm in terms of their competitors’ prices,






= F(Pj,1,t , . . . ,Pj,K,t). I
verify this guess by plugging in this guess to Equation (14), which implies the function F(.) is
implicitly defined by 1 = K 1Âk2K f ( f 0 1(Pj,l,tF(Pj,1,t , . . . ,Pj,K,t))). Note that this is consistent
with the guess and F(.) only depends on the vector of these prices. It is straight forward to show
that F(.) is symmetric across its arguments and homogeneous of degree -1.50 Now, given these
derivations, we can derive the demand function of firm j,k as a function of the aggregate demand,
its own price and the prices of its competitors. Similar to the main text we can write this as
Cj,k,t = J 1QtD(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t), D(Pj,k,t ,Pj, k,t)⌘ f
0 1(Pj,k,tF(Pj,1,t , . . . ,Pj,K,t))
Âl2K Pj,l,t f 0 1(Pj,l,tF(Pj,1,t , . . . ,Pj,K,t))
In the spirit of the CES aggregator I define h ⌘  f 0(1)f 00(1) as the inverse of the elasticity of f 0(x) at x=
1, and assume h > 1. It is straight forward to show that h is the elasticity of substitution between
industry goods around a symmetric point. Moreover, the elasticity of demand for every firms
around a symmetric point is h  (h 1)K 1 similar to the case of a CES aggregator. Also, define
z (x) ⌘ ∂ log( 
∂ log( f 0(x))
∂ log(x) )
∂ log(x) as the elasticity of the elasticity of f
0(x):z (x) = f
000(x)
f 00(x) x  f
00(x)
f 0(x) x+ 1. For
notational ease let z ⌘ z (1) and assume z   0 (z = 0 corresponds to the case of CES aggregator).
These assumptions (h > 1 and z   0 are sufficient for weak strategic complementarity, a 2 [0,1)).
50Symmetry is obvious to show. To see homogeneity, differentiate the implicit function that defines F(.) with
respect to each of its arguments and sum up those equations to get that for any X = (x1, . . . ,xK) 2 RK ,  F(X) =
Âk2K xk ∂∂xk F(X). Now, notice that for any a 2R,X 2RK ,
∂aF(aX)
∂a = 0. Thus, for any X 2RK , aF(aX) is independent
of a, and in particular aF(aX) = F(X)) F(aX) = a 1F(X).
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While the usual approach in the literature is to assume K ! • and look at super elasticities in
this limit, a part of my main results revolve around the finiteness of the number of competitors
and the fact that the degree of strategic complementarity is decreasing in K. Therefore, I derive
the degree of strategic complementarity for any finite K. With some intense algebra we get a =
z (K 2)+(1 h 1)2
z (K 2)+(1 h 1)K 2 [0,1). This imbeds the CES aggregator when z = 0, in which case a = (1 
h 1)K 1. This generalization allows us to match a high degree of strategic complementarity by
choosing a large z . However, this leads to a counterintuitive result where the degree of strategic
complementarity decreases with the elasticity of substitution. It is straight forward to show
∂a
∂h   0, z 
(1 h 1)2K
(K 2)(K 2(1 h 1)) ,
which holds for any K if and only if z  0, which combined with the condition z   0, implies that




2 .Thus, the Kimball demand also fails to generate a degree of strategic complementarity as high
as the average of 0.9 in the data, while keeping the properties a 2 [0,1) and ∂a∂h   0.
B.4 Proofs of Propositions for the Dynamic Model
Proof of Proposition 4.
Recall from Equation (12) thata = e
e
D
eeD+eD 1 , where eD is a firm’s elasticity of demand and e
e
D is its








,we have eD=h K 1(h 1). Moreover, eeD= (h 1)
2(1+x )(K 1)K 2
h K 1(h 1) .
Plug these into the derivation for a and we get a = (1+x )(1 h
 1)
K+x (1 h 1) .
Proof of Proposition 5.
This proof is an adaptation of the result in Lemma (7) for the dynamic case. Many arguments in the
proof are similar and are omitted to avoid repetition. At a given time t, let (St 1j,k )( j,k)2J⇥K denote
the signals that all firms have received until time t  1, and are born with at time t. In particular,
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for any j,k, St 1j,k = (. . . ,S j,k,t 3,S j,k,t 2,S j,k,t 1),where 8t   1, S j,k,t t ⇢S t t . This implies that
(1) S j,k,t t only contains information that were available at time t  t , and therefore are available
at time t, and (2) S j,k,t t is available for all other firms in the economy in case they find it desirable
to learn about it.
Given this initial signal structure, pick a strategy profile for all firms at time t:Vt = (S j,k,t ⇢
S t , p j,k,t : Stj,k,t !R)( j,k)2J⇥K, where Stj,k,t = (St 1j,k,t ,S j,k,t). First, similar to the static case, we can
show that in any equilibrium strategy p j,k,t(Stj,k) is linear in the vector S
t
j,k. This result follows with
an argument similar to Lemma (3). Given this, let p j,k,t(Stj,k) = Â
•
t=0 dtj,k,tS j,k,t t denote the pric-
ing strategy for any ( j,k) 2 J⇥K. This is without loss of generality because the equilibrium has
to be among such strategies. Notice that due to linearity and definition of S t , p j,k,t(Stj,k) 2S t ,
8( j,k) 2 J⇥K. Now, pick a particular firm j,k and let V ( j,k),t denote the signals and pricing
strategies that Vt implies for all other firms in the economy except for j,k. Similar to Subsection
A.4 let q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)⌘ (q,(p j,l,t(Stj,l))l 6=k,(pm,n,t(Stm,n))m 6= j,n2K)0 be the augmented vector of the
fundamental, the prices of other firms in j,k’s industry, and the prices of all other firms in the econ-
omy. Now, define w= (1 a, a




, 0,0,0, . . . ,0| {z }
(J 1)⇥K times





s.t. I (S j,k,t ,q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k ) k.
To show that a single signal solves this problem, suppose not, so that S j,k,t contains more than
one signal. Then, we know that p j,k,t(Stj,k) = w
0E[q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|Stj,k]. Notice that I am assuming
signals are such that these expectations exist. If not, then the problem of the firm is not well-
defined as the objective does not have a finite value. To get around this issue, for now assume
that the initial signal structure of the game is such that expectations and variances are finite. Since
both q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t) and Stj,k are Gaussian, p j,k,t(Stj,k) = Âd tj,k,tS j,k,t t by Kalman filtering. Here
for any S j,k,t t that is not a singleton, let d tj,k,t be a vector of the appropriate size that is implied
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by Kalman filtering. Therefore, by definition of S t , p j,k,t(Stj,k) 2 S t , meaning that there is a
signal in S t that directly tells firm j,k what their price would be under Stj,k and V ( j,k),t . Let
Sˆtj,k ⌘ (St 1j,k , p j,k(Stj,k)) and observe that by definition of p j,k,t(Stj,k), var(w0q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|Stj,k) =
var(w0q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|Sˆtj,k). Therefore, we have found a single signal that implies the same loss for
firm j,k under Stj,k. Now, we just need to show that it is feasible, which is straight forward from
data processing inequality: since p j,k,t(Stj,k) is a function S
t
j,k, we have
I (p j,k,t(Stj,k),q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k )I (S j,k,t ,q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k ) k.
which concludes the proof for sufficiency of one signal. Now, given St 1j,k and q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t) let
S j,k,t|t 1 ⌘ var(q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k ). Without loss of generality assume S j,k,t|t 1 is invertible. If
not, then there are elements in q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t) that are colinear conditional on St 1j,k , in which case
knowing about one completely reveal the other; this means we can reduce q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t) to its
orthogonal elements without limiting the signal choice of the agent. Now, for any non-zero sin-
gleton S j,k,t 2 S t , it is straight forward to show thatI (S j,k,t ,q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k ) = 12 log(1 
z0tS 1j,k,t|t 1zt), where zt ⌘
cov(S j,k,t ,q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k )q
var(S j,k,t |St 1j,k )
. The capacity constraint of the agent becomes
z0tS 1j,k,t|t 1zt  l ⌘ 1 2 2k .Moreover, notice that the loss of the firm becomes
var(w0q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k ,S j,k,t) = w0S j,k,t|t 1w  (w0zt)2.
This means that the agent can directly choose zt as long as there is a signal in S t that induces
that covariance. I first characterize the zt that solves this problem and then show that such a
signal exists. Notice that minimizing the loss is equivalent to maximizing (w0zt)2. The firm’s
problem is maxzt (w0zt)2 s.t. z0tS 1j,k,t|t 1zt  l . By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we know (w0zt)2 
(w0S j,k,t|t 1w)(z0tS 1j,k,t|t 1zt)  lw0S j,k,t|t 1w, where the second inequality follows from the ca-
pacity constraint. Observe that z⇤t =
q
l
w0S j,k,t|t 1wS j,k,t|t 1w achieves this upper-bar. The properties
of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality imply that this is the only vector that achieves this upper-bar.
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Hence, z⇤t is the unique solution to the firm’s problem.51 Now, I just need to show that a signal
exists in S t that implies this z⇤t . To see this, let S⇤j,k,t = (1 a)qt +a 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l,t(Stj,l)+ e j,k,t .
It is straight forward to show that this these signals imply z⇤t .
Proof of Proposition 6.
From the proof of Proposition 5 recall that in the equilibrium, for all ( j,k) 2 J⇥K, p j,k,t(Stj,k) =
w0E[q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|Stj,k] where Stj,k = (St 1j,k ,S j,k,t) and S j,k,t = (1 a)qt +a 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l,t(Stj,l)+
e j,k,t . From Kalman filtering
w0E[q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|Stj,k] =E[w0q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t)|St 1j,k ]+
w0cov(S j,k,t ,q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t))
var(S j,k,t |St 1j,k )
(S j,k,t E[S j,k,t |St 1j,k ]).
Notice from the proof of Proposition 5 that
w0cov(S j,k,t ,q j,k,t(V ( j,k),t))
var(S j,k,t |St 1j,k )
= lw0S j,k,t|t 1ww
0S j,k,t|t 1w = l .
Thus, using p j,k,t as shorthand for p j,k,t(Stj,k), p j,k,t = (1 l )E[S j,k,t |St 1j,k ]+lS j,k,t . Finally, notice
that p j,k,t 1 = E[S j,k,t 1|St 1j,k ]. Subtract this from both sides of the above equation to get p j,k,t ⌘
p j,k,t  p j,k,t 1 = (1 l )E[DS j,k,t |St 1j,k ]+l (S j,k,t  p j,k,t 1), where DS j,k,t = S j,k,t S j,k,t 1. Sub-
tract lp j,k,t from both sides and divide by (1  l ) to get p j,k,t = E[DS j,k,t |St 1j,k ] + l1 l (S j,k,t  
p j,k,t). Averaging this equation over all firms gives us the Phillips curve. To derive it, I take the
average of every term separately and then sum them up.




E[DS j,k,t |St 1j,k ] = (1 a)E j,kt 1[Dqt ]+aE j,kt 1[p j, k,t ].









p j,l,t  1JK Â
( j,k)2J⇥K
p j,k,t| {z }
=(a 1) 1JK Â( j,k)2J⇥K p j,k,t
.
51This solution can also be obtained by applying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
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The last term is approximately zero because J is large and e j,k,t ? pm,l,t ,8m 6= j, meaning that
errors are orthogonal across industries regardless of coordination within them. Now, define pt ⌘
1
JK Â( j,k)2J⇥K p j,k,t , and recall that qt = pt+yt . Therefore,
1
JK Â( j,k)2J⇥K(S j,k,t  p j,k,t)= (1 a)yt .
Finally, define aggregate inflation as the average price change in the economy, pt ⌘ 1JK Â( j,k)2J⇥K p j,k,t .
Plugging these into the expression above we get
pt = (1 a)E j,kt 1[Dqt ]+aE j,kt 1[p j, k,t ]+ (1 a)
l
1 l yt .




B.5 The Symmetric Stationary Equilibrium and the Solution Method.
To characterize the equilibrium, I will use decomposition of firms’ prices to their correlated parts
with the fundamental shocks and mistakes as defined in the main text. I start with the fundamental
qt itself. Notice that since qt has a unit root and is Gaussian, it can be decomposed to its random
walk components:qt = Â•n=0ynq u˜t n, where u˜t n = Â•t=0 ut n t , and (ynq )•n=0 is a summable se-
quence as Dqt is stationary and Dqt =Â•n=0ynqut n. Following Proposition 5 we know that given an
initial signal structure for the game (S 1j,k )( j,k)2J⇥K , the equilibrium signals and pricing strategies
are
S j,k,t = (1 a)qt +a 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,k,t(Stj,k)+ e j,k,t ,
p j,k,t(Stj,k) = E[(1 a)qt +a 1K 1Âl 6=k p j,l,t(Stj,l)|Stj,k] = Â•t=0 dtj,k,tS j,k,t t , 8( j,k) 2 J⇥K, t8t   0.
To characterize the equilibrium, I do a similar decomposition analogous to the one in the static
model. Given the pricing strategies of firms at time t, decompose their price to its correlated parts









j,k,tv j,k,t n is the part of j,k’s price at time t that is orthogonal to all
these random walk components (mistake of firm j,k at time t). Moreover, v j,k,t n is the innovation
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to j,k’s price at time t that was drawn at time t  n. In other words, I have also decomposed the
mistake of the firm over time. This decomposition is necessary because other firms follow all these
mistakes, but they can only do so after it was drawn at a certain point in time, in the sense that
no firm can pay attention to future mistakes of their competitors as they have not been made yet.
Before proceeding with characterization, I define the stationary symmetric equilibrium.
Definition 5. Given an initial information structure (S 1j,k )( j,k)2J⇥K , suppose a strategy profile
(S j,k,t 2 S t , p j,k,t : Stj,k ! R)k2K,t 0 is an equilibrium for the game. We call this a symmetric
steady state equilibrium if the pricing strategies of firms is independent of time, t   0, and identity,
k 2 K. Formally, 9{(an)•n=0,(bn)•n=0}, such that 8t   0,8( j,k) 2 J⇥K, p j,k,t = Â•n=0(anu˜t n+
bnv j,k,t n).
To characterize the equilibrium, notice that we not only need to find the sequences (an,bn)•n=0,
but also the joint distribution of v j,k,t n’s across the industries. To see this, take firm j,k and
suppose all other firms are setting their prices according to p j,k,t = Â•n=0(anu˜t n + bnv j,k,t n).









v j,l,t n+ e j,k,t
#
,
where by properties of the equilibrium e j,k,t is the rational inattention error and is orthogonal to
u˜t n and v j,l,t n, 8n   0,8l 6= k. Using the joint distributions of errors (v j,k,t n)k2K , by Kalman












v j,k,t n+ c˜ne j,k,t n)
for some sequences (a˜n, b˜n, c˜n). But in the equilibrium, p j,k,t =Â•n=0(anu˜t n+bnv j,k,t n). This im-
plies, an = a˜n, bnv j,k,t n = b˜n 1K 1Âl 6=k v j,l,t n+ c˜ne j,k,t n, where e j,k,t n ? v j,l,t n,8l 6= k. Using
the second equation we can characterize the joint distribution of (v j,k,t n)k2K,8n   0. This joint
distribution is itself a fixed point and should be consistent with the Kalman filtering behavior of the
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firm that gave us (a˜n, b˜n, c˜n)•n=0 in the first place. Finally, notice that underneath all these expres-
sions we assume that these processes are stationary meaning that the tails of all these sequences
should go to zero. Otherwise, the problems of the firms are not well-defined and do not converge.
I verify this computationally, by truncating all these sequences such that 8n  T¯ 2 N,an = bn = 0
where T¯ is large, solving the problem computationally, and checking whether the sequences go to
zero up to a computational tolerance before reaching T¯ . In my code I set T¯ = 100. The economic
interpretation for this truncation is that all real effects of monetary policy should disappear within
100 quarters. Such truncations are the standard approach in the literature for solving dynamic
imperfect information models.
The following algorithm illustrates my method for solving the problem.
Algorithm 1. Characterizing a symmetric stationary equilibrium:
1. Start with an initial guess for (an,bn)T¯ 1n=0 , and let for a representative firm j,k, S j,k,t =
ÂT¯ 1n=0
⇥
((1 a)ynq +aan)u˜t n+abn 1K 1Âl 6=k v j,l,t n+ e j,k,t
⇤
.
2. Using Kalman filtering, given the set of signals implied by previous step, form the best
pricing response of a firm and truncate it. Formally, find coefficients (a˜n, b˜n, c˜n)T¯ 1n=0 such
that p j,k,t ⇡ ÂT¯ 1n=0 (a˜nu˜t n+ b˜n 1K 1Âl 6=k v j,l,t n+ c˜nek,t n).
3. 8n2 {0, . . . , T¯ 1}, update an= a˜n, and bn such that bnvk,t n= b˜n 1K 1Âl 6=k v j,l,t n+ c˜nek,t n,
using ek,t ? v k,t , and the symmetry of the distribution of (v j,k,t)k2K .
4. Iterate until convergence of the sequence (an,bn)T¯ 1n=0 .
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-ations mean std mean mean std mean
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Construction 289 6.8 4.9 4.6 0.93 0.34 0.93
Manufacturing 715 8.2 6.4 4.9 0.87 0.37 0.96
Financial Services 617 8.6 6.5 5.0 0.93 0.28 0.92
Trade 419 9.0 6.3 4.7 0.90 0.32 0.91
Total 2040 8.2 6.0 4.8 0.91 0.33 0.94
Notes: Column (2) reports the average number of competitors along with standard deviations in Column
(3). Column (4) reports the average number of competitors weighted by firms’ share of total production
in the sample. Column (4) reports the average strategic complementarity along with standard deviations in
Column (6). Column (7) reports the average strategic complementarity weighted by firms’ share of total
production in the sample.
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Table II: Size of Firms’ Nowcast Errors
Size of nowcast errorsa
Observations Industry inflation Aggregate inflation
mean std mean std
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Construction 52 0.75 0.54 3.95 1.95
Manufacturing 363 1.43 1.72 2.55 2.04
Financial Services 352 1.51 1.51 4.23 1.73
Trade 302 0.63 0.90 2.31 1.93
Total 1,069 1.20 1.49 3.11 2.09
Notes: the table reports the size of firms’ nowcast errors in perceiving aggregate inflation versus industry
inflation for the 12 months ending in December 2014.
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Table III: Subjective Uncertainty in Forecasts of Firms
Subjective uncertainty in forecastsa
Observations Industry inflation Aggregate inflation
mean std mean std
Industry (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Construction 289 0.99 0.87 1.17 0.76
Manufacturing 715 0.83 0.60 1.01 0.65
Financial Services 617 0.81 0.61 1.01 0.71
Trade 419 0.85 0.63 1.02 0.71
Total 2,040 0.86 0.66 1.04 0.70
Notes: the table reports standard deviations of firms’ reported distribution for their forecasts of industry and
aggregate inflation. Forecasts were for yearly inflation for the 12 months ending in July 2017.
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Table IV: Subjective uncertainty of firms given their number of competitors.
Subjective uncertainty about
industry rel. to
aggregate inflationa industry inflationb aggregate inflationc
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number -0.021 -0.024 -0.010 -0.007 0.012 0.017
of competitors (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Firm controls
No Yes No Yes No Yes
and industry FEs
Observations 2,040 1,910 2,040 1,910 2,039 1,909
R-squared 0.036 0.050 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.017
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Notes: the table reports the result of regressing the standard deviation of firms’ reported distribution for their
forecast of aggregate inflation (a), and industry price change (b) on number of competitors and a set of firm
controls. Columns (5) and (6) report the results of regressing the difference of the two standard deviations
on the number of competitors.
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Table V: Calibration
Parameter Description Value Moment Matched
l Capacity of processing information 0.7 Persistence of now-cast errors
K Number of firms within industries 5 Average Number of Competitors
h Elasticity of substitution in industries 6 Average Markup
x Curvature of the elasticity of demand 40 Average strategic complementarity
r Persistence of nominal demand growth 0.5 Nominal GDP growth in NZ









Figure I: Non-neutrality of money in the static model
Notes: the figure depicts the real effects of a shock to a nominal demand within the static model.
The magnitude of the real effect decreases with the capacity of processing information and in-
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Figure II: Distributions of firms’ nowcasts for both aggregate and industry level inflation
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Figure III: Distributions of the size of firms’ nowcast errors for aggregate and own-industry inflation
Notes: the dashed vertical lines denote the means of these distributions.














Figure IV: Overall effects of oligopolistic competition
Notes: the figure shows impulse response functions of output and inflation to a 1 percent shock
to the growth of aggregate demand, for overall effects of different values of K. More competitive
economies respond more strongly and more quickly to the shock. See Section 5 for a discussion
of these results.
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Figure V: Effects of oligopolistic competition through attention reallocation
Notes: the figure shows impulse response functions of output and inflation to a 1 percent shock to
the growth of aggregate demand, for reallocation effects of different values of K. More competitive
economies respond more strongly and more quickly to the shock. See Section 5 for a discussion
of these results.














Figure VI: Effects of oligopolistic competition through strategic complementarity in pricing
Notes: the figure shows impulse response functions of output and inflation to a 1 percent shock
to the growth of aggregate demand, for strategic complementarity effects of different values of K.
More competitive economies respond more strongly and more quickly to the shock. See Section 5
for a discussion of these results.
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